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Update on security and human rights issues in South-Central Somalia, including in Mogadishu

Joint report from the Danish Immigration Service's and the Norwegian Landinfo's fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia

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Introduction and disclaimer

In January – February 2012 the Country of Origin Information division of the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) as well as the Norwegian country of origin information (COI) unit Landinfo undertook fact finding missions to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia. However, as these missions were not joint fact finding missions separate reports and notes were produced as a result of these two missions.¹

However, in the summer of 2012 the DIS' Country of Origin Information division and Landinfo decided to undertake a joint fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia. This joint Danish-Norwegian mission was conducted from 17 to 28 October 2012. The purpose of the mission was to gather updated COI on South-Central (S/C) Somalia, including Mogadishu on matters mainly related to security, human rights and humanitarian issues.

The mission comprised a series of interviews with interlocutors in Nairobi and Mogadishu. The Danish-Norwegian delegation consulted non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), international organisations, including United Nations (UN) agencies and individuals. A full list of interlocutors interviewed can be found at the end of the report at hand.

The list of interlocutors interviewed was decided upon by the delegation based on the delegation's previous experiences from former fact finding missions to Somalia and Nairobi, Kenya as well as the expertise, remit and role of each interlocutor, their relevance to the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the mission. Additionally, the list of interlocutors was also decided by advice from consultations with key interlocutors as well as by availability. Altogether the delegation consulted 19 interlocutors and in addition the delegation held meetings in Nairobi with the Danish and Norwegian embassies. Finally, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Mogadishu was consulted again (by e-mail) on 3 and 4 December 2012 in order to get a short update on issues related to the announcement of a new Somali Cabinet on 4 October 2012.

Due to security advice from the Norwegian and Danish embassies in Nairobi the delegation only visited Mogadishu twice and only for one day at a time. All meetings in Mogadishu were held at the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Conference Center near the Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu.²

All interlocutors who were interviewed were informed that the delegation's final fact finding report would be a public document, and all agreed to have their reviewed and approved meeting notes included in the report at hand. Each interview note has been forwarded to the relevant interlocutor

¹ http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/90821397-6911-4CEF-A8D0-6B8647021EF2/0/Security_human_rights_issues_South_CentralSomalia_including_Mogadishu.pdf

² Mogadishu International Airport is also called Aden Abdulle International Airport.

for comments and final approval before being including the report at hand. However, one interlocutor did not respond to the note forwarded despite several reminders. This note has been included in the final report as forwarded to the interlocutor and it is referred to anonymously. Altogether 11 of the 19 interlocutors requested to be referred to anonymously. These interlocutor's statements have been referred to anonymously. See list of organizations and individuals consulted at the end of this report

It should be noted that the report at hand does not intend to be inclusive regarding security, human rights and humanitarian issues in S/C Somalia. The findings included in this report are closely related to the COI requests from the Danish and the Norwegian immigration authorities and the two countries' appeal boards. These requests are based on the need of updated COI to address asylum claims from Somali citizens in Denmark and Norway.

This fact finding report includes no policy or analysis and, unless otherwise indicated via a footnote, is based entirely on the approved interview notes and/or other documentary material provided by the listed interlocutors. Whenever the delegation found it relevant it has included some references to already published material. Where it has been necessary to explain or clarify a point or phrase made by an interlocutor, the authors (i.e. the delegation) have provided short additional supplementary explanations. These have all been marked in closed brackets [...].

The delegation would like to thank AMISOM for facilitating meetings at its conference center in Mogadishu and the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Nairobi for providing logistical support and assistance to the mission. The delegation would also like to thank all interlocutors for their kind support as well as their patience and professional cooperation with the delegation during and after the fact finding mission.

The delegation to Nairobi and Mogadishu comprised Grethe Neufeld, Senior Adviser, Landinfo, Oslo, Norway and Jens Weise Olesen, Chief Advisor, Country of Origin Information division, DIS, Copenhagen, Denmark.

This report is available at the DIS's website www.newtodenmark.dk and Landinfo's website www.landinfo.no

1 Overview of political developments since February 2012

United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) stated that the newly elected President of Somalia has many pressing tasks in Mogadishu including making changes in the leadership of the security forces; police commanders etc. However he does not have yet full control of what is going on and he is also supposed to handle other national political issues like the question of federalism and to establish law and order, but he is currently mainly focused on internal Mogadishu issues.

Peter Klansoe, Regional Director, Danish Refugee Council (DRC) considered that the main challenge for the President and the Premier Minister of Somalia would be to address the internal problems in S/C Somalia. At the moment [mid October 2012] the UN Security Council is awaiting a clarification of the security situation as well as the political situation in S/C Somalia.

When asked if he has a similar degree of optimism as were expressed in February 2012 to the DIS, Peter Klansoe, DRC stated that he is still optimistic regarding the developments in S/C Somalia, including Mogadishu. It was added that the election process of the President was a positive sign. The next steps and processes are important and they will have to take the time that is needed. Everyone participating in the political processes should feel that they have been heard and that they are being represented properly. However, there are many obstacles and challenges. One challenge is how to handle the negotiation processes; another is the position of Puntland. If Puntland does not accept to be included in the political processes there will be a completely different situation. In addition to these challenges the President of Somalia lacks well-functioning military and police forces. There are many examples of soldiers of the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) undertaking violations of human rights.

According to Kilian Kleinschmidt, Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (e-mail correspondence 3 and 4 December 2012) the President has taken a number of measures to get at least Mogadishu under control. Illegal checkpoints are being removed and militias are beginning to withdraw. The presidential decree announcing the death sentence for rapists is a very strong message although not implemented yet.

Peter Klansoe, DRC stated that a number of UN reports on corruption are making it imperative for the President to address this problem. However, there is not much the President can do about this at the moment as he is not even in control of all of Mogadishu. In addition there are the classic sources of income and revenue, especially the port of Mogadishu. The big question is who controls these sources of income as there are many clans competing for access to these resources. On the other hand the President enjoys the support of the SNAF as well as the international community, but the SNAF does not have sufficient equipment including arms and other weapons. Today the critical issue is how the various clans have access to sources of income. This issue is the key to peace or conflict.

According to Peter Klansoe, DRC the President of Somalia is a person of the intellectual elite and some people do not necessarily see him as a legitimate president. However, Peter Klansoe considered the election process as a positive step in the political developments in Somalia even though one cannot say that it was [a] real democratic election process. The President enjoys widespread support among intellectuals in Middle Eastern countries.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) explained that during the transition [period] very little was done to improve the infrastructure. The new president knows and the new government will have to deliver in order to fulfil some of the expectations that people have. Otherwise the government will lose the momentum and spoilers can take advantage of the situation.

Saferworld explained that during August, September and October 2012 there have been ongoing political processes in Somalia. A new President, a Speaker of Parliament and a Prime Minister have all been elected and the Transitional Federal Government's (TFG's) mandate has run out. Many persons have been aspiring to political positions and many are disgruntled. Many of these are connected to religious groups and some had contacts with al-Shabaab. This link was weakened but not broken. So as long as there are disgruntled individuals there will be support for al-Shabaab.

Tony Burns, Director of Operations, SAACID – Australia stated that the [governmental] institutions you have in Mogadishu [and in the rest of] S/C Somalia are on paper and it would take decades to establish functioning institutions and genuine government services, and billions of dollars; and the question is if the European Union (EU), the US and others are interested in state building or just combating terrorism.

Following the endorsement by the Somali Federal Parliament of the new Council of Ministers announced by Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon on 4 November 2012 the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) released the following press statement by the UN Special Representative:

“UN Special Representative Statement on the Endorsement of the Council of Ministers Mogadishu, 13 November 2012.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia (SRSG), Dr. Augustine P. Mahiga, has welcomed the overwhelming endorsement by the Somali Federal Parliament of the Council of Ministers announced by Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon on 4 November.

"This is another important milestone in the history of Somalia," SRSG Mahiga said, "the appointment of clean slate of just ten Ministers conclusively demonstrates the will of the Somali leadership to move away from the mindset of the past and bring about positive change. I am particularly pleased with the historic appointments of two women to substantive high profile as Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Development and Social Services." "I commend Prime Minister Shirdon and President Hassan Sheikh for their extensive consultations with a wide cross-section of Somali society inside and outside of the country that produced this inclusive Cabinet which bears all positive hallmarks of a potential good government.

It was a remarkable exercise in confidence building. The new Council of Ministers represents a broad spectrum of political shades and membership while taking clan balance, equality and representation into account. It also reflects the cultural and social realities of today's Somalia." said the SRSG.

"I congratulate all the new Ministers and wish them every success in the hard tasks that lie ahead. Dr. Mahiga said. "UNPOS will continue to work with our Somali partners to improve the Government's capacity, enhance political reconciliation, strengthen the security and judiciary sectors and to facilitate reconstruction, especially in the recently recovered areas in accordance with the President's six pillar policy."

"I also wish to commend the Members of the Somali Federal Parliament for debating the Cabinet's nominations and work programme in a transparent, democratic and open manner. Their vote of confidence signifies the dawn of a healthy relationship between the new Executive and Legislative Institutions in Somali politics. It symbolizes enlightened leadership, unity and determination of all Somalis to invest in a brighter future for the nation," the SRSG said."³

Regarding the announcement of a new Somali Cabinet on 4 November 2012 the Brussels-based news agency Equal Times⁴ reported on 6 November 2012:

"Somalia celebrates a political milestone with new cabinet, by Amina Adan Mahamud.⁵

"Somalia's steady progress towards peace and stability was marked by the announcement of a new cabinet this week. It follows the elections in September, the country's first free election since the military dictator Siad Barre took power in 1969. Somalia's new, ten-member cabinet was announced by Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon Saaid on Sunday [4 November 2012]. And for the first time in the nation's history the cabinet will feature two female ministers, including Fowsiyo Yusuf Haji Adan who has become Somalia's first-ever female foreign minister. Adan, who originally hails from the self-declared autonomous region of Somaliland, said of her appointment: "*This is a triumph for Somalia and Somali women. It heralds a new page in politics,*" she said.

Adan will be joined by another female colleague, Mariam Qassim Ahmed, who has been appointed the Minister for Development and Social Affairs. It was a position she previously held in former Somali President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed's transitional government.

³<http://unpos.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=g5DMFbX5NVo%3d&tabid=9705&mid=12667&language=en-US>

⁴ Equal Times: <http://www.equaltimes.org/news/somalia-celebrates-a-political-milestone-with-new-cabinet>

⁵ Amina Adan Mahamud is a journalist working for the Somali Media Academy in Mogadishu. <http://www.equaltimes.org/author/amina-adan-mahamud>

In September [2012], Somalia inaugurated 56-year-old former university dean Hassan Sheikh Mahamud as president. It was the first time in more than forty years that Somalis were able to elect a leader, marking an end to eight years of transitional administration. It was also widely seen as heralding a new chapter in a country often regarded as “*the world’s most failed state*”.

Somalia was plunged into civil war in 1991 when Barre was overthrown by a coalition of armed clans. But a power struggle between the various factions quickly descended into conflict, resulting in a still ongoing war which has left an estimated one million people dead.

Of late, large parts of Somalia, in particular the capital city of Mogadishu, have seen relative peace and stability. This has resulted in a number of Somali refugees living in the diaspora (more than an estimated one million people) as well as internally displaced peoples (more than 1.3 million people) returning home to help contribute to Somalia’s redevelopment.

But the al-Qaeda linked Islamist group al-Shabab still controls much of southern and central Somalia, and has staged numerous suicide attacks in Mogadishu since it was driven out by a coalition of African Union troops and pro-government forces last year. And only last week, one of the country’s best-loved comedians and playwrights – Warsame Shire Awale – who was a well-known critic of al-Shabab, was gunned down in an apparent assassination attempt.

The formation of a government in Somalia was previously determined by a traditional system of power-sharing popularly referred to as the ‘4.5 formula’ (the country’s 475 MPs are allotted by a ratio of one seat going to each of the four major clans and 0.5 to the a coalition of minority clans).

The 4.5 formula was agreed on by Somali elders as an attempt to find a lasting resolution to the incessant power struggle between the country’s various clans. Somalia’s four biggest and powerful clans – Hawiye, Darood, Diir and Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirifle) –shared the three top positions in the transitional government (the presidency, parliamentary speaker and premiership), while representatives of minority clans were given lesser positions in the government. But this time, as the government only features ten cabinet positions, not all clans have been represented.

However, President Mahamud was keen to point out that this was not meant as a slight but as an attempt to “*save Somalia*”. “*Those (sub) clans who missed themselves in the list should know that they are not hated,*” he told reporters at a press conference on Sunday. Prime Minister Saaid even has a specific brief to stamp out nepotism and clan rivalry. Most Somalis are tired of decades of fighting and are desperate to see a strong federal government.

But the new cabinet faces a raft of challenges including massive corruption, chronic underdevelopment as a result of decades of conflict, the continuous threat of violence and huge unemployment.”

On 15 November 2012 the United States (US) Department of State published a press statement on the announcement of a new Somali Cabinet:

“The United States welcomes the confirmation of the new Somali Cabinet by the Somalia Federal Parliament on November 13. This overwhelming endorsement by the federal Parliament is historic and marks progress in ushering in a new era of accountable and representative leadership. It also demonstrates continued constructive cooperation between the executive and legislative authorities in Somalia. This new cabinet, with equal minority clan representation, reflects the diversity of the Somali population; and the presence of two women, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Fawzia Yusuf Haji Adan and Minister of Social Services and Development Dr. Mariam Kasim, underscores the active participation of women in Somali society. The United States remains steadfast in its support for the Somali people and looks forward to working with the new cabinet as it begins the challenging work to promote security, stabilization, and economic revitalization for all of Somalia’s regions and people.”⁶

⁶ US Department of State: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200592.htm>

2 Military and security developments in Mogadishu

2.1 Level of fighting in Mogadishu

Regarding the security situation in Mogadishu Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, Mogadishu, stated that a dramatic improvement has taken place since February 2012. Today there are less gunfire and no artillery. These are simple indicators which demonstrate a process from war to tremendous improvement in security. However, there are still many security challenges as there are incidents, including grenade attacks every night. There are daily attacks on AMISOM by al-Shabaab along the road from Hoosh to Afgoye. In addition al-Shabaab is infiltrating Mogadishu. Since the transition in August 2012 the security situation has become a little tenser. During the period from January to June 2012 approximately 3.000 gunshot injuries have been recorded in Mogadishu.

Regarding the overall security situation in Mogadishu compared to February 2012 Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, explained that there are anecdotal reports showing that:

- The overall number of security incidents has fallen.
- There are still a lot of collateral civilian casualties.
- There are a lot of targeted assassinations, especially against journalists. Some of these attacks have been quite impressive.
- The presence of militias allied with the government is of concern.
- There is not much police engagement.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA added that there are approximately 50 hand grenade attacks on various security forces in Mogadishu a week.

Regarding security in Mogadishu an international organization explained that there is a lack of government in some parts of Mogadishu and this is especially prevalent in the outskirts of the city. It was added that the power of the government and its security forces is due to the presence of AMISOM.

Regarding security in Mogadishu the international organization explained that AMISOM is present in Mogadishu. AMISOM patrols the streets of the city, but only in military vehicles and not on foot as government soldiers do. Without AMISOM the government would not be able to keep Mogadishu under its control. To the knowledge of the international organization, the last shelling involving AMISOM within Mogadishu (at its outskirts) was in early 2012.

UNDSS explained that most of the 12.000 AMISOM soldiers once deployed in Mogadishu to focus on security just in the city are now deployed (end of October 2012) elsewhere leaving at one time just 400 soldiers to secure the entire city. The number of AMISOM soldiers in Mogadishu is however somewhat higher today [end of November 2012]. It is important to note in this context that Somalia is not a post-conflict state; it is still an evolving conflict in the country.

UNDSS explained that Mogadishu is governed by the government, its security forces and government supported militias.

Regarding civilian casualties in Mogadishu, an international organization explained that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to present exact figures as there is often no reporting. Many wounded never attend hospital for treatment. The international organization also estimated that the problem of civilian casualties is one related to all armed stakeholders in the city. However, the international organization believed that there is a decrease in the number of civilian casualties in Mogadishu, relative to the last few years. This decrease is due to front-line fighting having moved out of Mogadishu. There are now fewer mass-casualty attacks and killings, in particular due to the cessation of shelling in Mogadishu. Still civilian casualties remain a daily occurrence, principally due to assassinations, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks, and reactions to these attacks by armed forces. Recent grenade and suicide bomb attacks on theatres and cafes, such as the August 2012 attack on the Jezira Hotel, cause numerous civilian casualties.

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) the number of civilian casualties in Mogadishu has decreased considerably compared to February 2012 and today civilian casualties are at a minimum. In July 2011 two thirds of Mogadishu was under al-Shabaab control.

Bombardment and shelling killed many, but this is no longer taking place. Today you have targeted attacks and sometimes by-passers get killed. It's a question of being at the wrong place at the wrong time.

According to Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu the security situation in Mogadishu changes rapidly, but the situation has improved a lot since February 2012, it could even be considered stable, but fragile. Security incidents can happen, but actions [by al-Shabaab] are not so much coordinated as before. Crossfire etc. has diminished, likewise suicide missions. In February 2012 many people were afraid of leaving their houses as attacks including suicide attacks were a regular occurrence. In February 2012 you also had a lot of displacement because of the famine and many people from central Somalia came to Mogadishu in search of aid. The food aid also attracted a lot of militias etc. that tried to loot the food. This also led to confrontations where civilians were killed. However, this situation has improved and thus also contributing to less civilian casualties.

According to a local NGO in Mogadishu (B) there was slightly more fighting in Mogadishu during May and June 2012 as compared to mid-October 2012. Today there is no direct fighting and incidents are hit and run attacks in the outskirts of Mogadishu and at times suicide bombing [in the center of Mogadishu]. AMISOM and SNAF control the city although one cannot say that the city is completely secured. The NGO explained that there is a difference between the areas where one had systematic military interventions i.e. to capture, hold and secure (which are areas with sustained security structures), and those areas al-Shabaab simply vacated or retreated from. The latter ones are

the districts of Daynile, Hurriwa and Karaan and parts of Yaqshid district. In these areas you also have people who could be al-Shabaab or from other spoilers and splinter groups

A local NGO in Mogadishu (B) explained that there is no longer sustained artillery in Mogadishu and there have been no direct fighting between the two sides since May/June 2012 within Mogadishu areas. The fighting has been sporadic hit and run attacks lasting for a short time, often between 10 to 15 minutes and maximum for an hour. These attacks mostly occur in the districts of Karaan, Hurriwa, Daynile and parts of Medina.

Tony Burns, SAACID – Australia explained that al-Shabaab still operates in Mogadishu through the clan structures. However it lacks funding, and the decision to withdraw from the city in August 2011 was economical; and AMISOM's role was only to provide the element of attrition to a process that was already forgone. Today the situation in Mogadishu is completely different from [the period] before August 2011 when al-Shabaab pulled out.

Tony Burns added that today there are occasional bombings, assassinations, etc. In addition to al-Shabaab merging into both old clan structures and clan/criminal syndicates and thus making the picture blurry, there are both criminals and others claiming to be or posing as al-Shabaab.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) stated that there is still a risk that some of the District Commissioners (DCs) in Mogadishu may turn into real warlords. It is a very important and crucial task for the government to deal with the DCs in order to ensure that they will not become warlords again.

Peter Klansoe, DRC explained that the 16 DCs of Mogadishu are still very powerful and their militias are not easily disarmed. A number of these are in reality warlords; however some of them are more harmonious and peaceful than others.

When asked about the influence and power of the various warlords, i.e. certain DCs in Mogadishu, an international organization explained that the role of this new warlordism is not high. This is due to the facts that people from the diaspora are coming back to Mogadishu in increasing numbers, there is a lot of business and reconstruction in the city and people do not want this to be destroyed by warlordism.

According to Saferworld there are a lot of investments and construction going on in the capital, but most people doesn't ask themselves Mogadishu of who? Before Mogadishu was a national capital for all groups and clans, today the city is a Hawiye-dominated city.

The former editor of a Somalia news agency explained that the security situation in general is better for most people since you don't have the shelling and fighting which characterized the situation before al-Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu. However districts that used to be relatively safe have become insecure. Wadajir [also called Medina], Hamar Weyne and Hamar Jabjab were safe, but have become more insecure areas according to the former editor. Again this is due to the change of

al-Shabaab tactics and the ability of the group to infiltrate and kill not only high profile individuals, but also persons who has a link or contact to the government.

The former editor of a Somalia news agency exemplified this by telling about a lady selling tea to government employees who was killed. Another woman was killed in the Bakara-area because she was the sister of a government soldier. The former editor contextualized this further by explaining that today people are much more outspoken. Before people in al-Shabaab areas wouldn't dare to speak out, now the areas are liberated and people express themselves. But just expressing negative opinions of al-Shabaab can endanger people. Ordinary people also need to work and support themselves, and instead of "dying from hunger" you may take a job affiliated to the government. Some find work with NGOs, others in the seaport and so on. All together this makes more people exposed and targeted.

2.1.1 Security situation for civilians in Mogadishu

Regarding main challenges for ordinary people in Mogadishu Ayaki Ito, Deputy Representative, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees – Somalia (UNHCR – Somalia), Nairobi explained that things are changing quite rapidly at the moment. The situation is improving, but the UN is concerned about the security vacuum. Security is an issue at the moment as AMISOM is presently [mid October 2012] out of Mogadishu and clan militias have expanded their influence. Government soldiers as well as politicians are committing violations. Recently there have been hand grenade attacks in Karan, Yaqshid, the livestock market (Hurriwa) and even Hodan.

Saferworld explained that from previous experiences in Mogadishu fear is deeply rooted in people. In order for people to trust that improvements are taking place and that they are real the government institutions should be in place and this is not the case yet. The government is only a government by name.

Saferworld stated that people in Mogadishu do not yet trust their government and that it is al-Shabaab's strategy to retain fear among ordinary people. Al-Shabaab will continue to install fear as long as the government is unable to provide security. In order to remove fear among people the government and the police have to be more visible in Mogadishu.

The former editor of a Somali news agency stated that there are two major problems for civilians in Mogadishu today:

- Soldiers not being paid/regularly paid, thus making soldiers rob and kill just for a mobile phone.
- The explosions and the targeted killings plus mistaken identity killings, and the civilians unintended killed in connection with targeted killings.

The former editor explained that if you can buy or hire a gunman anyone, even well off private people as well as business people and other influential individuals can get away with killing opponents or people they have a grudge against. Such killings mostly happen with total impunity.

According to the former editor there is an ever increasing proliferation of armed guards used by for example Somalis returning from the diaspora. These people can protect themselves by using their own private militias. The ordinary civilians cannot afford this kind of protection. But these armed guards and militias are also responsible for civilian deaths when they engage in shooting in order to defend themselves from attacks.

The former editor added that his news agency has also focused on soldiers not being paid. This is the major problem in Mogadishu and other parts of S/C Somalia where you find government soldiers, since the soldiers turn to robbery and thus creating insecurity.

According to Peter Klansoe, DRC the security situation in Mogadishu is presently more complex and unpredictable as compared to the period during which al-Shabaab was in control of parts of the city [i.e. before August 2011]. The areas of Mogadishu that were controlled by al-Shabaab had some kind of law and order as well as security, despite the serious human rights abuses committed by al-Shabaab. Today there is a security vacuum in parts of the city and this is due to the fact that it can be difficult for people to distinguish between militias, government soldiers and criminal gangs. In addition there are the notorious “gatekeepers”, i.e. militiamen controlling the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps.

Peter Klansoe, DRC emphasized that the security situation in Mogadishu is strongly influenced and reliant on developments in other parts of S/C Somalia. In this regard the process regarding access to sources of income is decisive for the stabilization in S/C Somalia, including Mogadishu. These sources of income are especially pronounced in Mogadishu’s Bakara market and its port, but also in Kismayo (the port), Lower Juba (bananas), Baidoa (the livestock market), Belet Weyne (agricultural land), and Lower Shabelle (bananas).

An international organization explained that the change in the pattern of violence and violations is due principally to the changing dynamic of the conflict in Mogadishu from largely conventional warfare, to asymmetric. Outside Mogadishu, indiscriminate attacks on civilians also continue to occur.

Regarding the situation in Mogadishu an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) explained that al-Shabaab terrorized people when it had control over most of the city. Al-Shabaab directed its attention towards children and women and waged an ideological war against these groups and especially children were recruited to al-Shabaab as fighters. Even though al-Shabaab does not control any part of Mogadishu any longer people are still concerned whether or not the government will be in full control and they still fear al-Shabaab. The international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) added that the Islamists, not al-Shabaab, are in power in Mogadishu in every aspect.

Regarding AMISOM and its military strategy the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) explained that AMISOM does not yet let the SNAF operate on its own. People in Mogadishu are very happy with AMISOM, but they still fear al-Shabaab as they do not believe that the government will be able to protect them against al-Shabaab if AMISOM leaves Mogadishu. It was added that it is important for people in Mogadishu to ally themselves with the Islamists, not al-Shabaab, in order to be protected.

The international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) added that due to the improved security situation in Mogadishu the NGO decided to open an office in Mogadishu in June 2012.

Killian Kleinschmidt, OCHA explained that today the people of Mogadishu feel more insecure in relation to al-Shabaab than they were three months ago because al-Shabaab's strategy is to intimidate people and infiltrate the city. People are now more cautious against potential al-Shabaab infiltrators.

Regarding security in the Afgoye Corridor Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA explained that security has improved in the corridor, but exact population figures for the Afgoye Corridor are not available. Whenever exact population figures have been given they are likely to be wrong.

Regarding the situation in the Afgoye Corridor an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that AMISOM is still present in the area and this force is much more disciplined than the SNAF. SNAF soldiers commit crimes such as looting and robbery as well as other violations of human rights. People are much more comfortable with AMISOM soldiers than SNAF soldiers. However AMISOM forces are in their camps and they are generally not involved in humanitarian support to people, except from a hospital they run in Afgoye. There is also the Hawa Abdi - hospital in the area which is used by the locals.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu emphasized that people now have freedom of movement even though there are two districts, i.e. Helliwa and Medina, which are still difficult to access. Helliwa is still an al-Shabaab stronghold during night time with many al-Shabaab supporters, so you need protection to move there. There is a lot of police in Helliwa, but al-Shabaab is also very much present in the sense of having a lot of sympathizers but not necessarily militants. Since the area is recently liberated there is also a lot of lawlessness, and both government soldiers and police being responsible for looting and rapes. Because of this many civilians feel that they were actually safer during al-Shabaab since they didn't have to worry about sexual assaults, rapes and so on. At times civilians felt safer under the al-Shabaab ruling as indiscriminate looting and rapes and killings were not as widespread as they are in the liberated areas during the initial deployment of government forces, although these very protection concerns were still very much taking place in the al-Shabaab's controlled area. However, Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu stated that in general the security situation in Mogadishu has improved a lot.

According to Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu the most disadvantaged right now [is any young person] since the government is very vigilant of any al-Shabaab attack, and [it has] a perception of what an al-Shabaab militant look like, [it] is any young person or student who fit that perceived profile, that is being clean cut, doesn't smoke or chew khat, or coming from al-Shabaab areas. There have been many such cases of young people being detained because they fit this perceived profile. It was added that young people who actually have left Shabaab are also in a limbo since they cannot go back to the al-Shabaab areas, and in the city [Mogadishu] they also encounter insecurity.

Tony Burns stated that during the past two months [September and October] the security situation [in Mogadishu] has deteriorated, and you are seeing more-and-more clans remobilizing. In addition there is no command and control within the SNAF or the police structures and the police are actually controlled by individuals along particular sub clan lines.

Tony Burns explained that people's greatest fear today is not al-Shabaab but the incapacity of the government to protect, provide genuine security, and create meaningful institutions that deliver real services.

An international organization explained that people are awaiting an improvement of their lives and for some time to come will give the new government, and its supporters, the benefit of the doubt. However, it is assumed that al-Shabaab will continue to seek out and exploit weaknesses to destabilize the government; and failure to deliver, on security and the economy in particular, will put support for the government at risk. Nonetheless, for the time being, there is a significant sense of optimism among the people of Mogadishu.

Regarding the AMISOM police now in Mogadishu, Tony Burns, SAACID – Australia, stated that they are spending their time in the compound, receiving their salaries, doing little else and this is creating tensions between the Somali police [Somali National Police (SNP)] and their AMISOM counterparts. People see AMISOM as an occupying force.

According to Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, there are approximately 250 AMISOM police officers patrolling Mogadishu. The AMISOM police officers are cooperating with the SNP forces. The SNP as well as AMISOM police officers are visible in the streets of Mogadishu. UN is preparing to let these police forces protect the IDP camps as the notorious “gatekeepers” is a sign of a disease.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA explained that there are certain districts of Mogadishu in which the SNP has still difficulties with access. It was emphasized that a well-functioning police force is a precondition for humanitarian assistance and resumption of service delivery to the population to function.

According to Saferworld some parts of Mogadishu like Yaqshid and Hurriwa are not easily accessible and probably as much as 1/3 of all 16 districts people are still unsafe, and many people are afraid of moving around. Especially in Karaan and Helliwa but even in Wardhigley where you

find Villa Somalia there have been incidents. There have also been killings in safe areas like Medina and Hamar Weyne.

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) the safer areas of Mogadishu is the area around the presidential palace Villa Somalia, Hamar Weyne, K4 area near Ambassador Hotel, along Mekka al Mukarama road, K5 area, Medina, around the airport road and part of Waberi. The parts of Hamar Jabjab close to Hamar Weyne are also considered a safe area where people tend to settle. Hamar Weyne has grown, one reason being that this was one of the first districts that came under government control/influence, but you have a lot of government soldiers as well as armed militia in military uniform in this area (which can cause problems in terms of crime) and you have al-Shabaab infiltration even here.

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) in general the security situation has improved in Mogadishu, there is a kind of normalization, people are going to the beach and new restaurants have opened along the beach and it is more common to see cars moving even after dark. On the other hand – soldiers are not being paid, the police are not present to protect people and sometimes persons are being randomly arrested. Even though the capacity of al-Shabaab is reduced it is still present in the local community blending in together with the rest of the population, thus being able to carry out attacks.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) explained that Mogadishu is safer than any other area of S/C Somalia and it is mainly people from the diaspora who return to Mogadishu, i.e. people who wishes to retrieve their property because land is very valuable and business people looking for investments and opportunities. Mogadishu is relatively peaceful, there is a lot of reconstruction work going on, much aid came in last year due to the drought so that was a pull factor, [there is a] semblance of stability, work opportunities and huge optimism. These are the main pull factors. It was added that the stability in Mogadishu has caused the Somali shilling to increase against the USD. A lot of money is coming into Somalia these days.

The international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) reiterated that the positive developments in Mogadishu is completely dependent on the government's ability and will to deliver services and it was emphasized that the new government gives a hope that things will improve.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (A) explained that there are many issues and challenges facing the people of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab is still present, secondly the national security forces are weak and even recruit among former al-Shabaab members, and thirdly people resent both the Kenyan [Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF)] and Ethiopian [Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF)] troops present in the country regarding them as uninvited foreigners.

According to the local NGO in Mogadishu (A) most people do not dare to speak out against al-Shabaab because they fear the group might return to power, and al-Shabaab still has access and possibilities of killing opponents. The general perception among people is that al-Shabaab can hit

you. But there are also other forces operating in Mogadishu that are creating fear among people. There are former militias now being part of the government forces, and there are foreigners being part of intelligence operations within Somalia that have their agents and informers in the city. Besides people haven't forgotten the indiscriminate shelling and actions by AMISOM in 2008 and 2009, and on top of everything people are traumatized by the long lasting conflict. But there is also optimism and hope, many areas are liberated, people are returning from the diaspora in order to start businesses, to invest or to look after or reclaim their property and the political developments contributes to the optimism. People are also optimistic regarding political developments. They have been positive towards the election of a President, a Speaker of Parliament and a Prime Minister.

Property and land issues

In addition to the [security] challenges Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, also brought up the property and land issues. Compared to the situation in February 2012 there are increasing reports over fighting and disputes over land. These conflicts do not necessarily involve the use of firearms. The international community cannot solve these issues, but in rural areas of S/C Somalia the elders still have some influence and they may be the only option to settle land disputes properly. This is however not the case in Mogadishu and other urban areas of S/C Somalia. It was added that as the situation improves and normalizes there will be an increase in the number of disputes over land.

Peter Klansoe, DRC explained that property prices in Mogadishu are increasing significantly because of improved security in the city. Many are investing because they believe things will happen in the future based on a rather cynical calculation that the international society has invested so much in Somalia and AMISOM will be present for a long time to come and secure Mogadishu. So there is no risk the al-Shabaab will be able to retake Mogadishu.

2.1.2 Civilian casualties and violations

Ayaki Ito, Deputy Representative, UNHCR, presented to the delegation statistics on violations in Somalia (including Puntland and Somaliland). The top five reported numbers of victims of violations during the period January to October 2012 were:

- Excessive use of force (by the authorities or the police)
- Rape
- Killings/manslaughter (including assassinations)
- Physical assault/attack not resulting in death
- Illegal arrest and detention

The total reported number of victims of violations by month (from January to October 2012) was:

- January 600
- February 300
- March 800
- April 600

- May 550
- June 350
- July 600
- August 650
- September 600
- October 500

Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, emphasized that these figures are not comprehensive and should be used to discern trends. The figure for June 2012 is too low because of underreporting due to local partners being busy with other issues at that time. The jump in March 2012 is due to AMISOM announcing that it would invade the Afgoye Corridor and at the same time Ethiopian troops invaded Baidoa and drove out al-Shabaab from the city. These operations caused massive movements of people, an increase in the number of casualties and arrests by all sides. Finally, in August 2012 there were a lot of violations, including air strikes, threats and increasing levels of arrests and forced recruitment by al-Shabaab. This caused a lot of paranoia and in some areas people were kept from moving by al-Shabaab. Consequently, there was decrease in the movement of people trying to flee conflict areas.

Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, explained that there is a lot of underreporting of violations and incidents especially in al-Shabaab controlled areas. UNHCR has partners in each district in S/C Somalia and these are responsible for gathering information on violations and forward these to UNHCR. However, at times when payments for these services to partners are delayed for some reason (example reporting June 2012) there is a tendency of underreporting. On the other hand over-reporting may also be an issue.

Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, further explained that from time to time UNHCR receives increasing figures on violations and incidents in certain districts due to better access to these areas. On the other hand the media is not reporting or focused on all of Somalia. For example in Puntland there is an increasing level of violations and incidents related to clan conflicts and political turmoil as well as al-Shabaab infiltration and IEDs. However, these matters do not always show up in the media. Underreporting has also been an issue in areas of S/C Somalia. For example has Kenya's airstrikes in the South-West and the displacements of people caused by these airstrikes not been properly reported by the media. The media very often gives only a glimpse but not a pattern.

Concerning civilian casualties in Mogadishu Peter Klansoe, DRC explained that it is difficult to state whether or not these casualties have increased or decreased since February 2012. However, today it is more common that persons who are involved in various kinds of disputes are more at risk of being targeted than other people.

According to Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu the number of civilian casualties has decreased considerably [in Mogadishu] if you compare with 2010 when people were caught in a lot of crossfire, today there is not a lot of actual conflict in the city, but you do have targeted

killings, as well as many guerrilla tactic assassinations and homicides that go un-investigated. Still, security has improved as civilian casualties have decreased since February 2012.

In general security incidents have decreased especially during the last six months, i.e. since February 2012, according to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B). [It was explained that] the reason being less open confrontations between al-Shabaab and AMISOM. But the areas of Helliwa, Gubta (near Daynile), Dharkenley, Livestock-market and Kaxda are still insecure in the sense that you have minor clashes at night when a minibus with 15-20 al-Shabaab soldiers enter an area and launch an attack on a police station or a military post. In these incidents there might be shells landing and civilians might get hurt. These clashes may last up until 20 minutes. Apart from these incidents there are no direct confrontations causing civilian casualties. The reduction of aid coming in (last year during the drought tons of food aid came in) has, to some extent, actually also been positive because it caused crowding of people and situations where guards were firing at civilians.

A former editor of a Somalia news agency stated that the number of civilian casualties in Mogadishu has decreased since February 2012. This is due to the fact that arbitrary shelling and large scale fighting does not occur any longer. On the other, hand the former editor explained that targeted attacks are increasing.

Tony Burns, SAACID – Australia, explained that the wave of return from the diaspora during September and October [2012] has begun to plateau. Mogadishu has rightly never been safer than today, although there are still more than 500 gunshot victims in the city every month. However, this is a significant improvement on the AMISOM/Shabaab urban combat that occurred in the period before this current period, i.e. since August 2011.

Tony Burns, SAACID – Australia, considered this to be a clear improvement of the security situation, although the sense of safety in the city is relative and must be understood in the context of the situation in 2010 - August 2011 when a guestimate of 30,000 were killed and wounded by mortars and indiscriminate shelling by AMISOM alone (an estimated 8,000 killed, and the rest wounded). In addition you had the killings by al-Shabaab, essentially the same numbers, altogether very significant number breakdown. There is not a single family in the city that didn't have a family member killed or wounded during this period. Before this period you had the Ethiopian intervention in 2007-2008 with significant numbers of casualties, so this explains why people in Mogadishu describe today's situation as good. Tony Burns added that people have not become more supportive of al-Shabaab during the last six months, i.e. since early 2012.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (A) stated that there has been an increase in the number of targeted killings of journalists during the past six months, but the number of civilian casualties (collateral damage) has greatly decreased.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (B) stated that it believes there has been a decrease in civilian casualties in Mogadishu for the past six months, but numbers need to be verified. However, it was emphasized

that when there is no more any large scale fighting the number of civilian casualties naturally goes down. On the other hand, if one asked people living in for instance Daynile about the security situation, they would probably declare that it is unchanged compared to previous months or in Hurriwa where people would say al-Shabaab still is in charge, while people living in for instance Medina or near the airport would say that security has improved.

2.1.3 Presence of international organizations/agencies in Mogadishu

Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, explained that the presence of UN organizations in Mogadishu has increased since February 2012. Today there is permanent international presence of UNPOS, UNHCR, OCHA, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNSOA (UN Support Office for AMISOM). In addition International Organization for Migration (IOM) also has a permanent presence in Mogadishu.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, explained that there has been an increase in the presence of international NGOs as well as UN agencies in Mogadishu since February 2012. Presently UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, OCHA, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), UNSOA and UNPOS are represented by international staff in Mogadishu whilst all agencies have maintained national staff throughout the conflict. During the transitional period (August 2012) many international NGOs left Mogadishu temporarily. However there has been return of INGOs to Mogadishu, including INGOs, which have been reluctant to engage with TFG or even at times cooperating with the UN. Kilian Kleinschmidt expressed his concern that there may be casualties amongst local [NGOs] and INGOs if the return is not managed carefully. Risks are particularly linked to employment, corruption and diversion by officials and possibly staff of various organizations.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, stated that corruption is a major problem and endemic and it has to be addressed in order for the government to gain support among the population in Mogadishu, but also for more effective use of aid resources.

2.2 Al-Shabaab's presence in Mogadishu and its surroundings

Regarding al-Shabaab's presence in Mogadishu Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, explained that its presence appears less and the fear for al-Shabaab among ordinary people is also less. But al-Shabaab can infiltrate and there are individuals with certain profiles who have reasons to fear al-Shabaab. These are in particular individuals with ties to the SNG, defectors from al-Shabaab and media people. However, media people are not only targeted by al-Shabaab, they could be targeted by others as well. Ayaki Ito emphasized that the risk of an attack depends of where and who you are, and added that he did not believe that al-Shabaab has the capacity to install general fear among ordinary people in Mogadishu.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) explained that some of the killings and terror acts [in Mogadishu] might not be ordered by al-Shabaab's leadership, but are rather initiated by ordinary members or sympathizers. Anyhow al-Shabaab has the capacity to reach all parts of the city, as shown when they attacked the Jezira Hotel situated about 300 meters from the airport two

days after the presidential election in August 2012. It was added that targeted attacks most likely are ordered by the leadership of al-Shabaab.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (C) explained that it is young fighters of al-Shabaab who undertake attacks in Mogadishu. These attacks are not sanctioned by the leadership of al-Shabaab. Despite these attacks one can note a considerable reduction in the activities and attacks of al-Shabaab. This has implied that the central parts of Mogadishu have become even safer than they were in February 2012.

2.2.1 Influence of al-Shabaab in Mogadishu

A representative of an international organization explained that it is very difficult to assess al-Shabaab's influence in Mogadishu today because the situation is very complex.

Two factors come into play; the first one is that the government's focus is on the establishment of a government, and the second is that clans, influential individuals and groups are aligning in order to have positions within the new government. These two factors have affected security negatively.

However, al-Shabaab is militarily weakened. But its leadership is intact and their people on the ground are still present.

Peter Klansoe, DRC explained that it is not possible to state anything sensible regarding al-Shabaab's influence today in Mogadishu. As long as there are groups of citizens who are still critical and uncomfortable with the political processes and the government it is possible for al-Shabaab to get some support among citizens and groups. Al-Shabaab would then become a platform for groups who feel they have been excluded from the political processes, i.e. a tool for discontent. In addition al-Shabaab still has the capacity to undertake attacks in Mogadishu. Previously al-Shabaab enjoyed the support of many members of the minority groups as these groups have been marginalized and suppressed by major clans during the years of civil war in S/C Somalia. Mogadishu is a micro cosmos of Somalia. The same applies to Kismayo.

The representative of a local NGO in Mogadishu (C) stated that she and her staff hesitate to go to the Bakara market in Mogadishu even though the Bakara market has been liberated from al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is still present in the area although as small sleeping cells. One female staff member of the local NGO in Mogadishu (C) was taken away by al-Shabaab members in September 2012. The representative stated that she is more worried today than before al-Shabaab was defeated in Mogadishu. This is due to the fact that "before you knew where al-Shabaab was, today you don't."

Tony Burns, SAACID – Australia, explained how al-Shabaab and other groups exert their influence and control of people in the city which is rather transparent with its districts and neighbourhoods having been controlled by clans and sub-sub clan militias for at least the past 15 years. These people can pose as – or actually be police, military, al-Shabaab or freelance criminal militias – or all at the

same time. And they may wear military uniform, or say they are police but also al-Shabaab and thereby installing fear in people.

According to a former editor of a Somali news agency defectors from al-Shabaab arrested by the National Security Agency (NSA) are also recruited as NSA-agents. However some of them become double agents also paid by al-Shabaab. In the daytime they work for the government and during the night they work for al-Shabaab, and that endangers journalists among others. These double agents can do what the real al-Shabaab cannot do, since they have access to government circles they can carry out assassinations or facilitate such attacks. Some of these agents were arrested and jailed together with journalists, and these double agents told the journalists they were responsible for assassinations of several government employees.

2.2.2 Al-Shabaab's capacity to undertake attacks in Mogadishu

When asked about security developments in Mogadishu since February 2012 an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that many IDPs have returned to Mogadishu from their IDP camps in the Afgoye Corridor. However, many are still worried about their safety as some areas of Mogadishu are almost empty of people. Previously people knew where al-Shabaab was present and who controlled what. Today people are uncertain about the whereabouts of al-Shabaab. In addition there are assassinations in Mogadishu and one does not really know who is behind these targeted killings.

According to the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) people in Mogadishu fear the presence of al-Shabaab even though there are no battles in the city between al-Shabaab and the SNAF/AMISOM. This fear is due to the fact that al-Shabaab has changed its strategy from open confrontation to intimidation and imposing fear among ordinary people. People do not know where and who al-Shabaab is.

According to a local NGO in Mogadishu (B) al-Shabaab still has the ability to move around in Mogadishu, and it is hard to know where and who they are. In August 2012 al-Shabaab was capable of undertaking a terrorist attack on a restaurant. The newly elected president was the target of this attack. Al-Shabaab is still able to do harm and it will continue to do so in order to show that it is still around.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (B) explained that the strategy of al-Shabaab is rather to undertake attacks that will get the maximum attention of the media than targeting the average ordinary citizen. Asked about threats against ordinary people never opposing al-Shabaab, the NGO explained that al-Shabaab has been controlling many cities with thousands of inhabitants and these people still live there. As long as you don't challenge al-Shabaab, as long as you are not a politician or an activist but just living side by side with it, going to the mosque and otherwise staying out of its way, no harm will come to you.

According to Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, al-Shabaab is now under economic pressure and this is why it is economically rational for al-Shabaab to undertake more significant, but targeted suicide attacks.

2.2.3 Are some districts in Mogadishu more at risk of terrorist attacks than others?

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) there are areas of Mogadishu which are more or less controlled by al-Shabaab, but only during night-time. Al-Shabaab is not visible at daytime. This is especially the case in Deynile district. Some people still believe that al-Shabaab is more or less in control of Deynile and the livestock market. These two areas are almost empty of people and most people are afraid of staying in those areas as there are reportedly killings by al-Shabaab. However, people in general find that other areas of Mogadishu are safer than ever since the civil war began in 1991.

A representative of an international organization explained that the situation in Mogadishu is better today than in February 2012, in the sense that one sees several returnees, more investment and more reconstruction. There is greater mobility, people can travel as far as to Jezira beach and not just to the Lido beach, and the Bakara market is fully operational. People are now living in Karan and in the Gupta area, Towqfir and all the way to Hurriwa, unlike in February [2012] when people settled in Hamar Weyne, Hamar Jabjab, Wadajir, Hodan and Dharkenley. If this trend continues, it will have a positive effect on safety and security.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) explained that it has been difficult for al-Shabaab to conduct targeted killings in some areas [of Mogadishu] such as Wadajir (Medina) due to the fact that only one clan occupies the entire district and the district authorities have enforced strict security protocols for people visiting or entering into the district. However, districts such as Waberi and Hamar Weyne with mixed clan composition and with lax security arrangements has provided al-Shabaab the opportunity to strike at will. It is easier for al-Shabaab operatives to intermingle and operate freely in multi-clan areas.

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) people are still being intimidated by al-Shabaab since its members and sympathizers are part of the local community. It also has the capacity to launch attacks, especially in the outlying areas more recently taken by the SNAF. These areas are less safe than the city of Mogadishu, i.e. these areas are those most affected by attacks, whether it is grenade or bomb attacks, or hit and run actions against police posts.

According to the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) the most affected districts are Yaqshid, Karaan and upper side of Hodan where you need an armed escort to move as al-Shabaab is active in these areas. Hawlwadag, some parts of Daynile and Helliwa are controlled by al-Shabaab at night, according to local residents. People don't dare to report on al-Shabaab because they still don't trust that the government can protect them against al-Shabaab, and because of that there is a lot of underreporting, according to the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A).

Medina

A former editor of a Somali news agency stated that the worsening security situation in Medina was caused by government soldiers killing suspected al-Shabaab supporters, real or imagined. On top of that you have attacks by al-Shabaab and problems and insecurity caused by the armed Abgal Daud militia belonging to the powerful DC ruling the district. Revenge killings can also take place here if for instance a member of another clan is recognised as the killer of an Abgal member in the past. The fact that the police is not investigating crimes contributes to the worsening situation in Medina.

Hamar Weyne

According to the former editor of a Somali news agency the situation in Hamar Weyne has worsened, but not to the same degree as in Medina. One reason might be that this district is much more cosmopolitan than Medina (which is Abgal Daud dominated), but even here assassinations have taken place. The last victim was the manager of the airport. The revenge aspect is however not on the rise in this district.

Hamar Jabjab:

The former editor of a Somali news agency stated that Hamar Jabjab has also experienced an increased level of insecurity due to its location next to Hamar Weyne. This analysis is based on the fact that two journalists were recently killed plus a DC wounded in an attack. However, government soldiers are cracking down on youngsters suspected of being al-Shabaab supporters. The district itself with its narrow alleys makes attacks easy.

2.2.4 Al-Shabaab and forced recruitment in Mogadishu

UNDSS stated that there is no way al-Shabaab would be able to forcibly recruit or mobilize persons in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab only recruits in areas in S/C Somalia where it is in control.

Regarding recruitment to al-Shabaab in Mogadishu Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, stated that he found it hard to believe that al-Shabaab is able to recruit systematically, and there are no reports on al-Shabaab undertaking forced recruitment or threatening people to be recruited. Forced recruitment by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu today does not make economic sense. However, al-Shabaab may pay persons to undertake operations on its behalf.

Concerning forced recruitment to al-Shabaab a local NGO in Mogadishu (C) stated that if the government does not establish youth programs for young men in Mogadishu there is a risk that many of these will look towards al-Shabaab and some may even join its ranks. On the other hand there are reports that forced recruitment to al-Shabaab is decreasing. The local NGO in Mogadishu (C) had no reports of forced recruitment to al-Shabaab in the city of Mogadishu, but it could still occur in outlying districts like Hurriwa, where al-Shabaab still has some influence and presence. Al-Shabaab would not try to undertake forced recruitment in the more central areas of Mogadishu.

When asked if al-Shabaab recruit persons in Mogadishu an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) stated that it had not heard about this and added that al-Shabaab has lost control of

Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab only has some influence in Central Somalia. However, young persons can easily be manipulated as many would like to have power and money. This is a major reason why some youngsters turn to al-Shabaab. The NGO reiterated that it did not believe that al-Shabaab is able to undertake forced recruitment in Mogadishu as it does not even control a single district of Mogadishu. It was added that al-Shabaab members in Mogadishu do not dress as they used to. Today al-Shabaab members dress like anyone else in order for them not to be recognized.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that there are some examples of families having sent their children abroad in order to avoid recruitment to al-Shabaab. Recently a family in Mogadishu sent their two sons to Nairobi, Kenya in order to avoid them being recruited to al-Shabaab and in order for them not be suspected by the NSA for being al-Shabaab spies or fighters.

According to a local NGO in Mogadishu (C) there is a risk the people will turn to al-Shabaab and even support the movement if the government does not fulfill their expectations. Today, people are not idealistic; they will turn to those who will assist them, i.e. give them money and power.

Regarding recruitment to al-Shabaab in Mogadishu Saferworld explained that this is complex since al-Shabaab has different wings, including a clan element. It has a military wing, an ideological wing and a wing based on clan identity. The military wing of al-Shabaab has now been weakened and there are presently a lot of defectors from al-Shabaab. However, al-Shabaab's ideological and clan based wings have probably survived in some places. Al-Shabaab still has some clan connections, but the clan factor of al-Shabaab is one of the most complicated issues. However, Saferworld stated that "blood is thicker than water" and the clan is blood. There is a Somali proverb stating that even the most religious scholar would rather rejoice his clan than Paradise, in other words – clan is very important. Saferworld emphasized that it is the sub-sub clan level that is crucial as regards support for al-Shabaab. Saferworld considered that recruitment to al-Shabaab is complex today. It could be al-Shabaab trying to recruit among people, but it could even be people posing as al-Shabaab, there are clan groups, warlords are still there, but people might feel or believe that al-Shabaab is responsible since they have been the main recruiter for the past six years.

When asked why youngsters let themselves be recruited by al-Shabaab Saferworld explained that many young people do not see a future for themselves in Somalia and their economic opportunities are limited. According to Saferworld al-Shabaab is changing its shape, and it has now organized itself into more or less dormant cells and these cells are very cautious not to become exposed and discovered.

Saferworld found it unlikely that al-Shabaab undertakes forced recruitment today and the movement is not targeting very young people but rather tries to influence the elite, that is more prominent people, for example politicians and business people in order to get some backing.

According to Saferworld there were previously many youngsters, especially from the minority groups who joined al-Shabaab as these groups have been marginalized and their rights violated

throughout the civil war. Thus there have been much anger and frustration among members of these groups and joining al-Shabaab was a question of survival for many and an opportunity of getting revenge.

Regarding forced recruitment to al-Shabaab in Mogadishu an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) stated that al-Shabaab does not have the leverage to undertake forced recruitment today. They don't have the economic means to pay people and many people are defecting from al-Shabaab, and according to the NGO's assessment nobody is joining al-Shabaab any longer. People hate al-Shabaab and the NGO was confident that al-Shabaab is incapable of recruiting in Mogadishu. Previously many joined al-Shabaab as they did not have anything else to do, and al-Shabaab could buy people since it for instance had huge incomes from Kismayo, and losing Kismayo was devastating for al-Shabaab.

According to Tony Burns, SAACID – Australia, al-Shabaab may still recruit in Mogadishu, even though it does have the same financial means as before, it still has the brand and the brand is fear. But it cannot recruit on a large scale. Today it is much more likely to recruit on short-term contracts, where youngsters are hired for 'one-off' actions, such as to throw grenades, etc.

Tony Burns, SAACID – Australia, explained that he and his staff hadn't heard of forced recruitment in Mogadishu since the 2010 Ramadan offensive. Asked about the dead civilians found in some neighbourhoods, Tony Burns stated that beheadings and cutting of throats (in northern Mogadishu where al-Shabaab still has a stronger presence) could indicate that al-Shabaab was responsible. The reason might for instance be suspicion of spying for the government. Some of the killings by guns could be clan payback or any other reason. In either case there is still total impunity.

Regarding forced recruitment by al-Shabaab a local NGO in Mogadishu (B) explained that this is a difficult issue. The NGO did not believe al-Shabaab could recruit soldiers on a large scale, but it can ask people to spy for them, to undertake assassinations, to pay taxes etc., but large scale recruitment of soldiers could hardly be possible since among other things – where would it train the recruits? Besides in September 2012 more than 200 fighters defected, and al-Shabaab is a damaged organization. The NGO also meant that these things mostly occur in the outskirts of Mogadishu, not in the central parts of the city. However if you refuse to support al-Shabaab you may be in trouble.

According to Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu, al-Shabaab usually targets children and they are still recruiting among children in the IDP-camps and street children as well as in the rural areas, which are areas just in the outskirts of Mogadishu. There are also many children having been sent by their families from far away to look for a living in Mogadishu, and they are easily picked up by al-Shabaab on the way.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu added that al-Shabaab also recruits on an ad hoc basis, it looks for people to carry out specific missions for instance to place a box somewhere or to throw a grenade, afterwards they are paid a couple of hundred dollars. There are also still a lot of

sympathizers that would fight for al-Shabaab as they see this as an opportunity to gain power and money. Many individuals that have been marginalized based on their clan minority [status] became empowered by al-Shabaab, and it provided a platform for them to dictate and take vengeance on those who abused them before with this new found power. Tribalism has been a key entry point for al-Shabaab sympathizers of which a majority hails from minority clans.

According to a local NGO in Mogadishu (B) those most likely to be targeted by al-Shabaab for recruitment would be youngsters, often without family or close relatives, the disadvantaged and the minorities with less resources. Al-Shabaab has also recruited among some of the smaller Hawiye clans for instance Duduble and Murusade, whereas for example an Abgal of the Sa'ad sub-clan is less likely to be recruited to al-Shabaab. That does not mean they are not recruited but rather there are less [recruitment] of these clans. It was added that al-Shabaab would "love to recruit" insiders with links to the government or local NGOs.

Saferworld has never had reports of forced recruited by al-Shabaab. But whenever al-Shabaab took an area they would in the last few years target respected elders and clan leaders in order to get support. First it would try to use inducement, but if that didn't work it used the stick, and sometimes a combination of both. In many places the traditional elders or clan leaders in order to survive, gave al-Shabaab their loyalty and the first condition would be to bring recruits. So probably the elders put pressure on the youth to join al-Shabaab. Saferworld did not see any reason why al-Shabaab today should use forced recruitment or threaten youngsters in Mogadishu to join its ranks. On the other hand Saferworld could not exclude that al-Shabaab would put pressure on youngsters in order to use them as suicide bombers. Also it could be that al-Shabaab since it has had to change tactics, would rather recruit people that you wouldn't suspect were al-Shabaab, that is people working for instance with international NGOs.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) explained that those who have been recruited to al-Shabaab are mostly young people without possibilities, without education, without hope for the future. Youngsters sympathizing with al-Shabaab would do acts on behalf of al-Shabaab. Approximately 70% of the population are youth or young adults. They were born after 1991 when the civil war began and they have never experienced anything but war and conflict. Many of them, including minors have joined a militia or al-Shabaab.

2.2.5 Forced marriages and rape

Regarding forced marriages in a local NGO in Mogadishu (C) stated that early marriages are not a religious matter but it is culturally determined. It is not a new phenomenon in Somalia culture, but for some time many Islamists have manipulated or brain washed families in order to get hold of their young girls and marry them. The local NGO in Mogadishu (C) has reports that al-Shabaab members may even force girls to marry them without the consent of their parents. This is not taking place publicly as you do not see al-Shabaab in the open any longer. However, this practice has been a concern to many families, but it does not occur in Mogadishu today as al-Shabaab has been defeated militarily. Now al-Shabaab only has sleeping cells in Mogadishu and you do not see them

in the open. On the other hand al-Shabaab does undertake forced marriages in rural areas and there are families who move away from those areas in order to avoid their girls being forced to marry an al-Shabaab fighter.

Regarding forced marriages an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that previously this occurred, especially of children, even in Mogadishu. The NGO had not heard of instances today and did not consider it likely that forced marriages are taking place in present day Mogadishu. However, should it occur that al-Shabaab wants a girl for marriage one cannot seek protection against this by one's own clan, i.e. sub clan. If a father or mother denies such a request they risk being killed by al-Shabaab, and the fear for reprisals could stop people from telling about such threats. However there is a general optimism among the population of Mogadishu today and the occurrence of for instance forced recruitment and forced marriages have decreased. However, al-Shabaab still has informants in the city and people are aware of this, and the presence of these informants causes fear among people.

A UN agency explained that it now has access to most areas recovered from al-Shabaab and it has recorded that rape and forced marriages have been common in areas previously controlled by al-Shabaab. However, even today the figures for Mogadishu are still very high. More than half of the Gender Based Violence (GBV) cases registered during the first 6 months of 2012 involved rape and a quarter of the rape cases involved children, including young boys. The UN has access to information on violations in Baidoa, and Dhobley.

The UN agency explained that the agency has registrations of forced marriages and an overview of available data shows that approximately 10 % of the children and youngsters who have left al-Shabaab controlled areas were victims of forced marriages. Many of the girls were only of nine to ten years of age when they got married.

According to the UN agency the majority of victims of rape and forced marriage as well as other GBVs are IDPs, but there are also local women being victims of such violations. In some IDP camps in Mogadishu the security situation is so precarious that girls are kept away from the open in order for them not to be raped. Rape is normally committed at nighttime by armed men. The perpetrators are free to enter the IDP camps.

According to the UN agency very few rapes are related to Kenyan and Ethiopian soldiers as well as AMISOM soldiers. However there are soldiers from these armed forces who have sexually exploited Somali women for money, food or medication.

When asked if there is underreporting by international organizations in Mogadishu the UN agency explained that it did not get insight in the situation in the city until August 2011 when al-Shabaab left Mogadishu and later other locations in S/C Somalia. Before this the UN agency had limited knowledge of the magnitude of rape and forced marriage. However, the UN agency was aware that these violations took place but it did not know the figures and this was the reason for being reluctant

to publish any figures. Today UN agencies have access to areas that were previously no-go areas. In addition several international and local NGOs are now present in Mogadishu as well as in Baidoa and people are approaching the organizations whenever they need. This means that there are more reporting and information. However, it is difficult to compare the present situation to previous periods, but the situation of women and girls have improved as the UN agency have put in place prevention and response mechanisms for women and girls whose rights have been violated.

Regarding forced marriage by al-Shabaab Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, stated that he had no reports on this being the case today and added that “we do not hear about this any longer”.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) did not believe that forced marriages by al-Shabaab take place any longer in Mogadishu. It was however very common when al-Shabaab had control over the city.

However, forced marriages occur in areas under control of al-Shabaab, according to the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C). The normal procedure would be that al-Shabaab calls a family father in order to inform him that an al-Shabaab member wants to marry his daughter. There are families who flee al-Shabaab controlled areas in order to avoid forced marriages. It was emphasized that such incidents only occur in al-Shabaab controlled areas and that today there are no threats of forced marriages in Mogadishu.

Regarding forced marriages an international NGO working in Gedo explained that an SGBV [Sexual and Gender Based Violence] assessment was made last year, and forced marriages was one of the issues, but the NGO did not have any specific data on the prevalence of forced marriages. However al-Shabaab inhibited women’s freedom of movement through a decree stating that women travelling without a guardian (husband, father or brother) would be married off to an al-Shabaab member, and this could of course be considered as forced marriage.

The SGBV assessment showed that rape was a main issue, and the international NGO working in Gedo explained that most rape victims will not come forward or approach health care facilities themselves because women fear the stigma. The victims preferred to send a third party to get medication to avoid exposure.

According to an international NGO working in Gedo the majority of rape victims are either IDPs moving from one area to another during conflict or women moving from one place to another searching for food aid distribution. Being away from their clan areas they do not have the protection of their clan and the perpetrators enjoy impunity. But rape sometimes also happens within local communities when women are out doing their daily chores, fetching water or collecting firewood. Traditionally when rapes were committed within a conflict setting and the rapist was known, the victim’s community/family would be compensated. Rapes committed within the clan are resolved within the clan, but if the rapist belongs to a different sub-clan there will not be a peaceful resolution, but revenge. However, because of the stigma women tend to be silent. The NGO added that it is often very difficult to draw a line about who the perpetrators of rape crimes are.

From its staff working on educational programmes an international NGO working in Gedo received anecdotal information of mothers complaining that the cultural set up made them marry off their daughters at a very young age.

Regarding forced marriage a local NGO in Mogadishu (B) considered that this could still be an issue, but the NGO had no knowledge of whether it occurs or not. However, many families may have incentives in order to let their daughter marry an al-Shabaab fighter.

Regarding rape in general, Tony Burns, SAACID - Australia only have anecdotal information, but it seems to continue to remain on a high level.

2.2.6 Al-Shabaab's capacity to track down defectors

Regarding al-Shabaab defectors living in Mogadishu UNDSS stated that it had no reports of defectors being tracked down by al-Shabaab and added that al-Shabaab is on the run. The NSA has established a unit of defectors who now work for the authorities. In addition many defectors are being integrated into the SNAF.

Regarding defectors from al-Shabaab Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, explained that today there are fewer assassinations of al-Shabaab defectors. However al-Shabaab is capable of tracking down defectors and it is still an issue but there are now less assassinations of defectors. Even defecting ordinary frontline fighters are at risk of being tracked down. On the other hand the number of assassinations has gone down since June 2012. Until late June 2012 there was a high level of assassinations of al-Shabaab defectors. It was added that 300 fighters from al-Shabaab recently defected and they are held by the authorities in Masla Camp (now transferred to Jazeera). No one knows what to do with them and particularly their maintenance with food, health and basic necessities is a problem which is not a mandate of the humanitarian community. Approximately 10 to 15 of the defectors were minors and are taken care of by UNICEF in cooperation with AMISOM.

When asked if al-Shabaab defectors are being tracked down by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu Ayaki Ito, UNHCR explained that he doubted that defecting ordinary foot soldiers would be tracked down by al-Shabaab. However, rank and file defectors may be at risk of being tracked down. It was added that one never knows who is an al-Shabaab defector. Government officials often present too high figures on the number of al-Shabaab defectors in order for the government to receive extra funding for rehabilitation projects.

Tony Burns, SAACID – Australia explained that al-Shabaab is not tracking down defectors to the same extent as it did before, since it has less capacity. Besides there are larger scale defections today, for instance there are about 2,000 defectors in Bay Region (and the government are not getting necessary funding to reintegrate them). Tony Burns also stated that al-Shabaab never tried to systemically forcibly recruit people in rural areas, except for some individuals, but since this was not a sustainable method, it simply went through the elders and the clan in order to recruit.

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) al-Shabaab may try to kill defectors. The example given is al-Shabaab members who accepted the amnesty given to defectors. Some of them have been killed by al-Shabaab and some have been responsible for terror attacks like the café attack in September 2012 which was undertaken by a former defector.

When asked if al-Shabaab would track down defectors a local NGO in Mogadishu (B) explained that al-Shabaab used to say that: “You can’t desert and leave al-Shabaab behind, and live to tell the story”. However, the NGO had no information on whether al-Shabaab does track down defectors or not but stated that al-Shabaab is now a damaged movement.

Regarding al-Shabaab tracking down defectors an international NGO working in Gedo explained that most al-Shabaab defectors in Mogadishu have integrated into the IDPs community from which they originated and it is difficult to identify them.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) stated that young guys who left/defected al-Shabaab fear that they might be killed by al-Shabaab. Defectors are at higher risk of reprisals by al-Shabaab than any other category of people as al-Shabaab wants to show that all defectors are at risk of being killed. It is a publicly known phenomenon that defectors are being tracked down and killed, even foot soldiers, because al-Shabaab fear they might disclose information. But the main thing is that al-Shabaab will teach them a lesson. The NGO stated that those young men found killed in various districts were defectors being killed and added that al-Shabaab would behead defectors in the areas they control; in other areas beyond their control they would for instance kill defectors on their way to the mosque by shooting. It was added that assassinations committed by al-Shabaab are increasing. However one cannot exclude that there are other actors.

2.2.7 Persons at risk of targeted attacks and threats by al-Shabaab and others

A representative of an international organization explained that there have been rumours about a group of 300 assassins coming to Mogadishu with a list of people who are to be killed. People from the international community, AMISOM and people affiliated with the government are presumed targets.

It was added that targeted killings will continue, roadside bombs and IEDs will also continue to occur. Until the authorities are able to establish security structures and focus on the security apparatus insecurity will continue.

The representative of an international organization explained that people who are affiliated with the government, people who work with the UN or other high-profile individuals run some risk of being targeted by al-Shabaab.

Peter Klansoe, DRC explained that targeted attacks on individuals cannot all be blamed on al-Shabaab. There are plenty of reasons for internal power struggles and conflicts among people from the diaspora who are claiming property in Mogadishu. Many people from the diaspora are owners of some of the most valuable properties in the city.

According to Saferworld al-Shabaab probably threatens those who it believes can change the situation in Mogadishu to the better. Persons under threat could be politicians, civil servants, business people and prominent persons in general. Thus it is essential to accommodate al-Shabaab if a long term solution is to be achieved. People in general still fear al-Shabaab. And nobody knows who is al-Shabaab, it could be a friend or a colleague. This creates a lack of trust and fear, and al-Shabaab not only recruits people, its members also marry into local communities and so on. These locals will always remember al-Shabaab and as long as there are no alternatives, al-Shabaab will have support.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu explained that the victims of targeted killings are journalists, Members of Parliament (MPs), NGOs, human rights defenders and people who are in the public eye. As well as an uprising in the assassinations of key businessmen in Bakara Market. But the common perception today is that there could be many perpetrators behind the killing of journalists, not only al-Shabaab. It could be hired killers, and everyone who has money can hire a gunman, it could be warlords (you saw a lot of coercion and many killings during the selection of the MPs for instance). Al-Shabaab usually take responsibility very quickly for its actions, but for many deaths it has not done so, meaning there could be other perpetrators.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu explained that people do talk more freely today, but they are still careful and afraid of talking about al-Shabaab openly, since you don't know who is a al-Shabaab. Even those who haven't been threatened choose not to talk openly, and those who are threatened by al-Shabaab usually don't talk about it or act on it.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu added that people get threats by text messages or by phone, vague and simple ones like: "we know you and your whereabouts, so stop what you are doing", and even if you haven't done anything you feel insecure. Politicians, aid workers, people in the public eye etc. receive threats regularly.

When asked if civilians are victims of targeted killings an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that civilians are not a target but if they are at the wrong place at the wrong time they may become victims. This happened when the Jezira Restaurant was blown up by suicide bombers in August 2012. As a consequence many people are now afraid of going to restaurants.

When asked how al-Shabaab undertakes its targeted attacks in Mogadishu an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that hit [and run] attacks are often done by persons driving a motorbike.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that those who are targeted by al-Shabaab are person with a certain profile, for example MPs, people who work for international organizations or persons involved with AMISOM. It was emphasized that MPs are especially afraid of being targeted and assassinated by al-Shabaab.

When asked if ordinary people fear al-Shabaab an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that people are afraid that something will happen to them, they are also afraid that al-Shabaab may recruit their children or youngsters. In addition many fear of being killed by government forces in shoot outs with al-Shabaab fighters. People are afraid of being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) explained that those targeted today by al-Shabaab are people within the government and their families as well as journalists. Even ordinary people do get threats from al-Shabaab. Those are often given by cell phone.

The international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) reiterated that it is government officials or employees, people from the armed forces and journalists who are the main targets for Shabaab. However, the international NGO explained that most journalists fear the government more that they fear al-Shabaab. The day before the meeting with the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) a journalist from the Shabelle Media was wounded by shooting in Mogadishu.

Asked about the situation for journalists since February 2012, a former editor of a Somali news agency stated that the situation had deteriorated dramatically.

The former editor exemplified by telling that even their own security people could turn on them, simply because they were offered more money by others, i.e. al-Shabaab, to betray them. And even paying the guards more wouldn't necessary help, because al-Shabaab could overbid. Since the situation has deteriorated, most professional journalists have left the country.

The former editor explained that his news agency has been particularly targeted by al-Shabaab because it has taken a stand against the movement. The news agency was also accused of being un-Islamic because it had employed female journalists. But this news agency is not the only one being targeted. The former editor explained that other media people as well are targeted. They are targeted because they report on atrocities committed by the al-Shabaab, and "if you don't share al-Shabaab's views and you don't want to be their mouthpiece, you are targeted".

The former editor stated that the number one problem for journalists in Mogadishu today is corruption. If you write about corruption within the government and report on the fact that soldiers and police forces are not being paid because their salaries are lost in corruption you may be in real danger. In addition al-Shabaab has officially declared journalists as its enemy. This takes place via telephone and via the internet.

Asked if journalists were threatened by other forces, for instance the government, the former editor stated that the government as such hasn't reacted against his news agency, but individuals within the system might have been responsible for threats due to his new agency reporting about the widespread corruption within the administration. The governor, who is also mayor of Mogadishu, and the manager of the seaport have all been involved in corruption and mismanagement which have been reported by the former editor's news agency.

The former editor claimed that since al-Shabaab has lost the conventional warfare, and having turned to asymmetric warfare and terrorism, journalists were actually more exposed. Al-Shabaab can infiltrate and their sympathizers can operate in all parts of the city. Before August 2011 you had clear frontlines and less infiltration in areas outside al-Shabaab control.

Reporting on defectors is another area which has put the former editor's news agency in a position where different actors might want to harm it.

The former editor explained that he left Mogadishu earlier this year. According to witnesses a truck with men in soldier's uniforms drove into his compound, the men got off the truck and shot at one of his relatives. The former editor cannot tell for sure if this was al-Shabaab or government soldiers, but it is quite usual for members of al-Shabaab to use government uniforms in order to facilitate entrance to people and places. The former editor explained that he most probably was the actual target and the murder was a case of mistaken identity. The former editor has himself received numerous threats by phone and otherwise since 2007, but had ignored them.

According to Saferworld altogether 16 journalists have been assassinated in Somalia in 2012 (up to late October).

A international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) explained that even ordinary civilians could be at risk, if al-Shabaab thinks someone is a spy for the government it would threaten them and finally it may kill them. It also recruits young people on an ad hoc basis to undertake grenade or bomb attacks. If you don't accept you would be threatened or killed. However, according to the international NGO it is important to remember that also people within the government and business community could [also] be responsible for threats etc.

Ordinary people are afraid of talking about al-Shabaab according to the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A), and if al-Shabaab considers a youngster as an informant working for the government he risks being killed.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) stated that children with bombs attached to them are being sent off to targets by al-Shabaab who will then use a remote control to ignite the bomb, and the child will be blown up.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) explained that there are, however, also incidents where parliamentarians and politicians have been the targets of mortar attacks, and in these circumstances other civilians could get hurt. Quite recently this kind of attack happened in Shangani killing six civilians.

According to the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) the security situation is also characterized by infighting between government soldiers, and acts of crime, robbery, looting and rapes committed by government soldiers. Those who are direct targets of al-Shabaab are government officials, military personnel, District Commissioners, airport and seaport officials and

elders that participated in the selection of MPs and persons currently and previously involved in the political process. In addition people working with the UN and senior management in international organizations can also be targeted. But it is important to stress that if the perpetrators are unable to target senior management people they could easily target more junior staff. On top of that you have business people/contractors dealing with the government. However the current scale is reduced considerably compared to February 2012 mainly because people at risk limit their movements and are cautious.

Al-Shabaab is also targeting journalists and recently just ordinary people in order to show how they oppose signs of return to normal life for the people of Mogadishu according to the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B). This was clearly shown in the grenade attack against a wedding party in Hodan in October 2012. When al-Shabaab is defeated on the battlefield it resorts to terror. It is also important to note that al-Shabaab wants to make headlines, and that you do through some major attacks. The international NGO also mentioned that al-Shabaab would be against anyone trying to return to a normal life, including persons who are involved in sport arrangements, like soccer, but also hotel- and restaurant-owners.

It was added by the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) that al-Shabaab would also resort to killing of one person in order to have the target they actually want, to attend the funeral where he/she can be killed.

The international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) explained that even ordinary people are being threatened (and killed) by al-Shabaab, examples like three young men working for a local electricity company repairing the street lights near the livestock market who were killed. Rightly so these things happen on a smaller scale than before, but it still happens. People also experience threats which are being made in order to blackmail people for money. It was added, however, that al-Shabaab's presence in Mogadishu has been reduced to dormant cells.

Saferworld stated that al-Shabaab and other religious groups are very adaptive and can stay as dormant groups for a long time before they strike. Thus one cannot just say that it has been completely defeated. It still has influence on many people's lives.

According to Tony Burns, SAACID – Australia threats have become very usual during the past months and seem to be used as a viable business model targeting many in order to blackmail them. This is well known and people are talking about it every day. But those responsible are just as likely to be criminal syndicates/criminals, or others who are losing out on the economic boom, and not necessarily al-Shabaab. The purpose of threats is essentially to get money.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (A) stated that threats made by al-Shabaab are less common today compared to 2010.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (B) explained that al-Shabaab is [presently] more focused on human rights activists and advocates as well as politicians and other prominent persons.

2.2.8 Persons affiliated with international or local humanitarian organizations

Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, explained that the various UN organizations in Mogadishu are not necessarily a prime target of al-Shabaab. The risk for UN staff in Mogadishu comes from other groups such as various economic interest groups including DC's militias, gatekeepers, business people and others. UN staff could also fall victims of terrorist attacks if they are at a wrong place at wrong time. Al-Shabaab looks for more direct targets and it all depend on who you are and if you are at the wrong place at the wrong time.

Peter Klansoe, DRC stated that persons employed by or affiliated with international organizations are at risk of attacks by al-Shabaab members.

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) persons affiliated with international organizations are also at risk of being targeted by al-Shabaab.

3 Military and security developments in other areas of South/Central Somalia

Regarding the situation in the major cities in S/C Somalia Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, explained that al-Shabaab has left most of the major cities but the movement is capable of infiltrating many cities. The situation for civilians in the rural areas dominated by al-Shabaab in S/C Somalia is somehow different. Ayaki Ito explained that UNHCR is working on facilitated return to Baidoa in Bay region and returnees report about al-Shabaab dominating the rural areas around Baidoa. However, these al-Shabaab fighters are from the same clan as the returnees, thus the returnees state that they are able to feel fairly comfortable with these fighters. It was added that western Bay region is quite hard al-Shabaab controlled.

Regarding Hoddur in Bakool region Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, explained that al-Shabaab is hiding in the bush and the situation is quite bad and dangerous. There are little supplies going in to Hoddur.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (A) stated that the security situation has improved a lot since February 2012. However, AMISOM and the government forces have not defeated al-Shabaab, but al-Shabaab has lost parts of Hiraan, most of Bay and Bakool, Gedo and Kismayo area. However it is still active and able to take violent action, and according to the NGO al-Shabaab will not be beaten militarily or destroyed, it has to be done also through political reconciliation efforts.

The local NGO in Mogadishu (A) added that even though security has improved there are still many human rights violations in IDP settlements and in the liberated areas as well as in Mogadishu. Most of these violations are committed by security forces and government soldiers who are poorly trained.

The local NGO in Mogadishu (A) emphasized that it is important to note that the security situation is affected not only by al-Shabaab, but also other actors like various clan/militia interests, the incapacity of poorly trained security forces who engage in shootouts and thereby hurting civilians, and various other interest groups, i.e. businessmen and politicians. Those who are the main targets are media people and you also have random killings where civilians are being harmed. But there is no research on these killings and/or the perpetrators.

3.1 Areas of S/C Somalia under al-Shabaab control/influence

Peter Klansoe, DRC explained that in addition to the various power-struggles among clans and clan militias the presence of al-Shabaab in many districts and regions of S/C Somalia is a challenge to the international organizations operating in this area of Somalia.

Regarding security in S/C Somalia an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that al-Shabaab has no control over any major city in Somalia. Maybe Bule Burti and Galgaduud are to some extent dominated or influenced by al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab may also have some influence in the outskirts of some of the major cities in S/C Somalia but it has no control of major cities. However, the city of Brava is still dominated by al-Shabaab.

3.1.1 Security situation for civilians in al-Shabaab controlled or influenced areas

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) stated that there were a lot of human rights violations in al-Shabaab controlled areas of S/C Somalia. Al-Shabaab sometimes confiscated parts of the harvest or properties as *zakat*, undertook child recruitment, beatings, disappearances, rape, torture, killings, including indiscriminate killings, arrests, denying people access to basic humanitarian services and depriving women of all rights including forced marriages. These violations occur in all areas under control of al-Shabaab.

A UN agency explained that often it is the elders in each clan that decides which 'side' of the conflict the clan's fighters should be fighting on, and if the elders in the clan decides that they are pro al-Shabaab then the fighters will fight alongside al-Shabaab. However if the elders change side to the government/AMISOM then the fighters also change side. As such, sometimes one can see al-Shabaab fighters who are fighting a war but not because of Islamic convictions of 'holy war'.

3.1.2 Al-Shabaab's capacity to undertake attacks since the fall of Kismayo

When asked if al-Shabaab has the capacity to retake some of the cities [in S/C Somalia] it has lost Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, explained that it could be part of an al-Shabaab strategy to withdraw from these cities and wait for the system to fail. Presently there is a vacuum left by al-Shabaab and this vacuum has not been filled with anything reliable. However Kilian Kleinschmidt did not consider it likely that al-Shabaab wishes to retake any of the major cities it has lost. Instead al-Shabaab will be a major source of threat and insecurity along the main roads connecting the major cities in S/C Somalia.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, explained that in areas of S/C Somalia influenced by al-Shabaab people travelling along the roads are at risk of extortion by al-Shabaab as it lacks sources of income after having lost Kismayo.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, stated that the international military forces in S/C Somalia have firepower far beyond that of al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab still has many members and sympathizers, according to a representative of an international organization. But the question is what kind of financial strength the movement has after the loss of Kismayo, Merka and the Afgoye corridor. These losses will lead to certain limitations, but the consequences remain to be seen. One also hears about problems between the top leadership and deputy commanders and foot soldiers. The organizational structure of al-Shabaab which was the movement's strength is perhaps the movement's major challenge today.

3.2 Areas of S/C Somalia under government/AMISOM control/influence

An international organization explained that al-Shabaab does not control any part of the cities in S/C Somalia which the government and/or AMISOM have liberated from al-Shabaab. However, control is relative term in the sense that al-Shabaab is still capable to undertake hit and run attacks. The government and AMISOM have put up a number of checkpoints, and they arrest suspects in

relation to security issues and they try to gain control over main roads connecting the cities. It was added that civilians consider the SNAF as ill-trained as government soldiers are known to commit crimes such as lootings, sexual abuses and even killings. AMISOM soldiers are generally well-trained and its' soldiers are not known for such abuses and violations of human rights.

Regarding the NSA an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) stated that this security force arrest persons who it suspect are affiliated with al-Shabaab. The NGO had no verified reports on this issue but he hears about this when visiting Mogadishu.

Regarding the situation in Kismayo and Madobe as well as other locations in S/C Somalia Peter Klansoe, DRC stated that people still have little to return to. Many parts of S/C Somalia, including the self-proclaimed "mini states" are still battleground and people are still reluctant to return to these places. However, some are returning, but there are only very few substantial development programs in most areas, and the "mini states" are playing a negative role in this connection. There are continuing political disputes in many areas. There are changing clan-dynamics, especially when it comes to access to land and water and this fact is also a reason why only few are returning permanently to their place of origin. Return to place of origin may be very complex due to changing clan-dynamics in one's traditional home area. In addition many people are awaiting the announcement of a cabinet and the establishment of a functioning government. Today there are between 15 to 19 self-proclaimed presidents in "mini states" throughout S/C Somalia. Some "mini states" are clan based while others are based on private dominance. Some are better functioning than others, and some were established long ago.

Peter Klansoe, DRC added that there are still reports on new localized displacements in various locations in S/C Somalia, the latest being Kismayo. This is due to the fact that there are ongoing fighting between AMISOM, SNAF and Ethiopian forces and al-Shabaab in these locations. In addition the government only has little influence on the many "mini-states" which have been announced since 2011. So far it is only in Mogadishu that the government has influence and some control, and it is not the Somali government who has won the fight; it is the international society i.e. the armed forces of Ethiopia and AMISOM.

According to UNDSS it is important to note that the definition of control implies the physical presence of security forces and an established administration.

UNDSS explained that the implications for the locals with the new control structures [i.e. the liberated areas] must be seen in the context of what life was like during al-Shabaab rule when humanitarian workers were kicked out and al-Shabaab didn't invest anything in infrastructure, schools or health facilities. There were no developments at all in al-Shabaab controlled areas. In general in all the newly liberated areas people were sceptical during the first month, but slowly they are starting to appreciate and trust the newcomers. An example from the newly liberated areas is community support in fighting terrorist activities and cooperation on security issues i.e. that locals for instance are informing on where IEDs are planted, movement/activities of terrorists or those affiliated with terrorist groups etc. Now the community can see that there is a clear difference

between al-Shabaab rule and the newcomers - freedom of movement is guaranteed, humanitarian actors are coming in, educational facilities are coming back again, food is coming in, medical assistance as well. It has some other challenges for LAs [liberated areas] as many IDPs are moving to the liberated areas, and the town of Dhobley for instance have tripled the numbers of inhabitants from 10.000 to 30.000. Having all these facts the UN agencies are trying to re-establish a normal situation for the civilians in the liberated areas.

UNDSS explained that people have appreciated the changes in the areas which have been taken over by AMISOM/government-allied soldiers. For instance in Baidoa one could observe crowded roads and people doing small business within a short time after the takeover. This positive development is however linked to the establishment of a functioning administration.

UNDSS explained that there is an officially appointed temporary administration in Baidoa consisting of people coming in with the Ethiopian forces in February this year; however they have no firm connections with central government. In Kismayo, El Waq, Dhobley and Hoddur the situation is similar.

UNDSS stated that in other words we are facing an increasing fragmentation of Somalia which is affecting Hiraan, Galgaduud, Bay, Bakool and Gedo.

UNDSS explained that the visible government forces are actually only present in Mogadishu, Afgoye, Ceel waaq and Merka areas. In Belet Weyne, Baidoa, Kismayo, Dhobley, and Hoddur there are only some senior officers with some soldiers trained in Uganda and Ethiopia, but most of these forces are just local militia under the command of officers claiming to be the SNAF. These forces lack uniforms, food, ammunition, payment and there is no real command and control structure in place. The only improvement is in Baidoa, because it is the old administration (pre al-Shabaab) which has been re-installed after the Ethiopian forces took control of Baidoa in February 2012.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) stated that an obstacle which prevents IDPs from returning to their home area [in S/C Somalia] is the lack of administration and services by the government in the liberated rural areas from Baidoa to Belet Weyne and Afgoye, and in addition – government soldiers are committing rapes and robberies.

However, the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) explained that there is a movement from IDP camps in Mogadishu to rural areas, as al-Shabaab has disappeared from many rural areas. The farmers need some kind of security and semblance of stability in their home areas – and people wish to return, but al-Shabaab is not defeated in the rural areas and it is very much intact even though it has lost a lot of ground. If administration and security is provided al-Shabaab might lose further ground. It was added that al-Shabaab is still very much intact and not defeated in the riverine areas, i.e. the area in Central Somalia which lies between the two rivers Juba and Shabelle. Al-Shabaab has only melted away.

Hiraan region and Galmuduug

According to Peter Klansoe, DRC the “mini state” of Heeman and Heeb is financed by piracy while the larger “mini state” of Galmuduug is only partly financed by piracy. However, both administrations have existed for quite some time and they are rather stable and quite harmonious. How they will fare in the future is hard to tell. The question is also what kind of security they can offer their people and not the least minorities, i.e. the Bantus who have suffered so much through the past two decades.

Peter Klansoe, DRC explained that Hiraan region, which is a classic battleground for power struggles, has four self-proclaimed presidents. However, two of those are residing in the Nairobi suburb Eastleigh, which is inhabited by Somalis.

UNDSS explained that recently 500 Djiboutian AMISOM soldiers were deployed to Belet Weyne town. There is a Djiboutian liaison officer with the Mogadishu AMISOM Head Quarter (HQ) but there is no real command and control between the AMISOM HQ in Mogadishu and the Djiboutian contingent in Belet Weyne. There are areas controlled by the Ethiopians and there are also some government forces present in Belet Weyne. These forces were actually militia belonging to Abdifatah Hassan Afrah – current Governor of Hiraan region who was warlord during the Islamic courts.

When the Ethiopians captured Belet Weyne in February 2012 they didn't choose Ahlu-Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ) which is the strongest party in the area as an allied, but rather Abdifatah Hassan Afrah. Three months later he was elected the regional governor of Hiraan and his forces became TFG forces and now they are part of the SNAF.

ASWJ are controlling a small part around Mataban town. Ex-SVA [Shabelle Valley Alliance], Ethiopians and AMISOM are controlling other areas along the MSR [main supply route] Bergediid-Kalabeyr junction-Belet Weyne town. The rest of the areas are controlled by al-Shabaab with their main bases in Mahas and Tieglow.

There are still political frictions between ex-SVA and ASWJ mixed with other security and economic challenges in the region.

UNDSS explained that in Belet Weyne in Hiraan which was taken over some months before Baidoa, the situation is different from the situation in this city. Due to a longstanding conflict between the two clans (i.e. the Hawadle and the Galja'el) living on the east and the west side of the river dividing the Belet Weyne, and internal political power struggle the security situation is still volatile and unstable. Neither ordinary people - nor the LA [liberated area] officials - living on the east side of the river are crossing to the west side and vice a versa, there are road blocks and illegal check points on the roads leading to the town, [and a] high presence of armed clan militias.

Bay and Bakool regions

UNDSS explained that when the Ethiopians moved from Dolo in Gedo region they used the main supply road Dollow-Luuq-Baidoa and captured Baidoa town in February this year. They brought the old administration with them and they've quickly gained support and respect from the local community. Baidoa LA [liberated area] is quite well organized now, but there have been some challenges during the first three months (the arrival of spoilers/ex-warlords) that the governor succeeded to sort out with the support of the Ethiopians. The central government sent the deputy minister of defence who is a Rahanweyne from the area to the town. He is supportive of the governor, and after a month and a half the administration received recognition from the TFG.

UNDSS added that the local administration immediately started mobilizing youth in the area for military training after the takeover, and two groups with a total of 500 recruits were receiving training with some support of the former government (TFG) and the main assistance and support of the Ethiopians.

When asked if the security situation in Baidoa could be compared to the security situation in Mogadishu Ayaki Ito, UNHCR explained that these two cities are not comparable. In Baidoa al-Shabaab can still threaten anyone and one cannot compare the situation in Baidoa with Mogadishu as al-Shabaab has installed fear among ordinary people in Baidoa.

The security and humanitarian situation in Baidoa is much better than in Hoddur, according to a UN agency. Access roads are being opened and the security in the city is good. However, al-Shabaab infiltrates the city. The UN agency notes an increase in violence against women in Baidoa and when probed indicated that this could be related to the fact that there are now NGOs and human rights observers in Baidoa. This was not the case when al-Shabaab had control of the city.

UNDSS stated that it had no information of rape in Baidoa committed by Ethiopian soldiers.

UNDSS explained that the city of Hoddur has been under al-Shabaab blockade for some time and the only access to the city is by air for the international community. A governor and a nucleus administration are there, but the town itself is still surrounded by al-Shabaab.

UNDSS explained that the civilians in Hoddur were very positive to the arrival of UN representatives especially since they had brought humanitarian assistance. UNDSS stated that ordinary people could travel in and out of the city since the al-Shabaab blockade targets only transporters bringing commodities to the town. The situation in Hoddur has improved since the city was liberated from al-Shabaab.

Regarding the security and humanitarian situation in Hoddur a UN agency explained that the situation is terrible as the city is under siege by al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab even denies business people to deliver food, medicine and clothing.

Gedo region

Peter Klansoe, DRC stated that Gedo region is more harmonious and calmer than Hiran region.

UNDSS explained that in Gedo there have been clashes between the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) and other factions claiming Gedo belong to their regional state.

UNDSS explained that ASWJ-Gedo which to a certain degree cooperates with the central government controls Dolo, Luuq and Belet Hawo districts where there are fully structured administrations. El Waq is fully controlled by former TFG-forces which are now part of the SNAF, and there is some kind of command and control with central government. However the northern part (bordering Bakool region) of Luuq district and whole Bardheere district are still under al-Shabaab control.

There used to be some political issues and tensions among the district commissioners in Dollow, Luuq and Belet Hawo but it has been solved since Ethiopians replaced the DCs in Luuq and Belet Hawo in September 2012.

There is some al-Shabaab activity in the areas along the MSR Luuq-Baidoa and Qusanhdeere-Baidoa. Al-Shabaab used guerrilla warfare against the Ethiopian forces, but the Ethiopians have handled the situation and al-Shabaab is only capable of sporadic planting roadside bombs and setting ambushes on supply convoys. Hence, the road to Baidoa is fully controlled, and since the local communities realized al-Shabaab was no longer in control they have cooperated with the anti al-Shabaab forces and opened the roads for local transports and travel. Because of the cooperation and relationship with the local communities the level of al-Shabaab activity is very low with [a] declining trend in Al-Shabaab activities

Garbaharey town however is still on the frontline, and al-Shabaab regularly attacks the town at least once a week.

The Kenyan forces [KDF] and SNAF have tried to capture Bardheere, but since they would have to cross the river Juba, which is difficult, they still haven't succeeded. However they are taking control of the main supply roads leading to Bardheere step by step and al-Shabaab is in a defending position.

An international NGO working in Gedo explained that it is working in Dollow, Garbaharey, Bulla Hawa, Bardera, Burdhubo, Luuq, El Ade, Elgadud and El Waq as well as in some small villages. Some of these areas such as El Ade, Elgadud and Burdhubo are controlled by al-Shabaab. Garbaharey city itself is government controlled, likewise Dolo, Luuq and Bulla Hawa.

The international NGO is involved in education, water, sanitation, hygiene and livelihood programmes and it cooperates closely with local communities.

The international NGO explained that the local administrations in Gedo region are almost non-existent. There is no coherent administration to provide services. The government soldiers provide

some kind of security but nothing more. In Gedo region, the NGO supports 45 primary schools in different districts with 15.000 pupils, the real need is hard to ascertain, but 350.000 people are said to live in the region. Drought and insecurity make it hard for many children to attend school. There is a symbolic and very small school fee to be paid. There are three secondary schools and one vocational school in Gedo region run and supported by the NGO. Health facilities, too, are very scarce or nearly non-existing.

According to the international NGO people in Gedo region are in general positive to the new political leadership in Somalia because they are tired of war. In addition the new Prime Minister is a Marehan (the majority of people in Gedo region are Marehan). If the new leaders can meet the expectations of the people and provide security and basic services, development could be positive, otherwise one might face a dangerous situation. Today there are no standard basic services in Gedo region. Nothing is readily available and NGOs cannot replace government services. It is important that government and humanitarian development organizations remain active in the liberated areas. Otherwise there is a risk that al-Shabaab will return to those areas.

The international NGO explained that some IDPs have returned to Gedo, and some people from the diaspora have come to assess the situation. Some have given small donations or aid to local communities, but generally investments in this region are limited since the focus is on Mogadishu where business opportunities are considered to be far better.

Middle Juba region

UNDSS stated that all of Middle Juba is fully controlled by al-Shabaab. One also suspects that the al-Shabaab leader Godane is often in this area together with most of the remains of the foreign fighters.

UNDSS also informed that there are many cases of rape in Buaale and Sakow, especially in Buaale, since many of the al-Shabaab fighters from Kismayo and Merka has moved to this area.

Lower Juba region

Peter Klansoe, DRC explained that Lower Juba is especially complex and full of conflicts, some of which are classic clan based conflicts while others are more harmonious and balanced.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) explained that with the withdrawal of al-Shabaab from Kismayo one is seeing developments more or less similar to the security developments in Mogadishu. But it is important to note that threats and killings could also be the work of other actors than al-Shabaab.

Regarding Lower Juba UNDSS stated that the Ras Kamboni-brigade supported by Kenya so far has established local administrations in Dhobley, Afmadow and Badhaade (the DC is located in Ras Kamboni town). The central government has sent some MPs [members of Parliament] and senior military officers to Dhobley and Kismayo. However there is no evidence that they will have significant number of troops to support them. The picture in Dhobley is mixed since there are also

two representatives from the Kenyan supported regional state of Azania present. The administrations in Dhobley and Badhaade have several challenges; for instance on-going fighting with al-Shabaab on the frontline, the porous border with Kenya and cross border issues.

UNDSS explained that Kismayo is now the main focus of the international community and the city is a boiling place. SNAF is present in Kismayo. There is recently elected and appointed a temporary security council in Kismayo with 25 members from the local clans and sub clans within a week after the city was captured. The council is led by Ahmed Madobe, the leader of Ras Kamboni. The brigadier Yassin is his deputy SNAF commander in Kismayo from the Marehan clan. The security council in Kismayo also acts as a local administration. However there are frictions between the different actors which are not only politically motivated but also military, economically and clan based, and the administration is not yet well established and fully functional. Some security incidents, that credit for was given to al-Shabaab, were more likely related to the internal political frictions.

The remnants of al-Shabaab forces in Lower Juba have moved towards the jungle areas surrounding Bulo Haji and Badhaade areas. According to AMISOM/Kenyan [KDF] forces these groups will most likely defect.

There is also a triangle approximately from Badhaade, Hoosingo and Bulo Haji where no-one is in control. The main group of al-Shabaab has headed for Jamaame, Jilib, Buale and up to Dinsoor and even Merka.

In the small village Ras Kamboni there is a district commissioner (Badhaade) and in the even smaller village Bur Gabo there are some kinds of administrative structures which are cooperating and governing the area jointly with the traditional elders.

UNDSS had no information on who is controlling the Bajuni islands.

3.2.1 Security situation for civilians in areas liberated from al-Shabaab

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) in areas recovered from al-Shabaab human rights have improved a lot and people can talk more freely. However, there were three cases of rape in Kismayo during one week at the end of October [2012], but the perpetrator has been arrested. When AMISOM made its way to Kismayo in mid-September six civilians were killed by its soldiers. [In] the same vain [vein], when KDF took over Kolbio three local men were arrested by KDF and their bodies were later found, which KDF denied to have killed.

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) 90 % of the people in the areas recovered from al-Shabaab are appreciating the presence of AMISOM, the Kenya and Ethiopian armed forces and the SNAF. The NGO explained that previous fear of Ethiopia was “of another era”, i.e. in 2006 when Ethiopia drove out the United Islamic Courts (UIC) from Mogadishu. Today people see Ethiopia’s military operations in Central Somalia as necessary and positive. Al-Shabaab terrorized people and people are not 100 % sure how long the government and its allies will be

present in and secure their liberated home areas and that is the reason why they dare not to speak out against al-Shabaab. People in Belet Weyne (Hiraan region), and in Bay and Bakool regions will fear for their future if Ethiopia leaves. The international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) stated that should this happen al-Shabaab will surely come back and retake these areas. Of course there are people who do not wish to see foreign troops in Somalia, but this is a minority, according to the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C). It was added that people have confidence in AMISOM and AMISOM did not let the SNAF or the government allied militia Ras Kamboni operate on their own.

The international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) added that in areas recently recovered from al-Shabaab you are at risk of being arrested if you are suspected of being affiliated with al-Shabaab. People are not yet confident in the newly liberated areas and they are still afraid of speaking out loudly about al-Shabaab.

Tony Burns, Director of Operations, SAACID – Australia, explained that the situation in many of the newly liberated areas [in S/C Somalia] are characterized by government military units operating without local soldiers; and many of whom had not been paid for the last six months; and who are extorting and looting, and not providing security; and on the other hand, local militias setting up their own systems of law and order, traditional justice, etc. According to Burns conflicts in these areas are between the imposed government military units and the locals – usually being branded al-Shabaab, but in many cases they are simply locals just wanting to get rid of these imposed military units. There are overwhelmingly no services delivered in these areas, and one should note that there will be a 30 % cut to the UN of the total aid basket next year. Burns added that the new President of Somalia wants to do a lot of good things, but to date, he has not been able to get the international donors to donate money in order to pay the SNAF soldiers and police. According to Burns Somalia is not more corrupt than many other countries. The problem is lack of recurrent dependable funding by donors.

An international organization explained that the state of government structures, especially the detention and prison facilities are in a very poor state. The government does not even have a budget for keeping up detention and prison facilities. These would be an important, and almost certainly neglected, area of potential investment for donors for the coming years, anticipating plenty of challenges in the security sector.

4 Human rights issues in Mogadishu and its surroundings

4.1 Clan affiliation: protection, human rights and property claims

According to Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, the clan influence in Somalia has increased again since February 2012. The clan dimension is much more important in times of chaos and the transition period was built on clan affiliation. Clan consciousness is gradually increasing again and this could be a positive development in the sense that it is built on traditional honor and commitment. Kilian Kleinschmidt pointed to the important issue of property claims. Clan affiliation will be an important feature when it comes to property claims. Property grabbing and squatting are becoming major issues and according to traditional conflict resolution mechanisms it is possible that the clans may be able to settle these issues. In contrast to the situation in February 2012 property claims are becoming a major issue and there is a need for establishing a property commission as well as an appropriate claim procedure.

When asked if one's clan or sub-clan will provide support if needed Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, explained that today one will seek assistance and support from respectable and well off individuals rather than one's clan or sub-clan.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA considered that Kismayo will be a nightmare regarding upcoming property claims. In this regard the courts will be useless. Property issues can only be settled via traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. A return to conflict resolution mechanisms is the only way to settle property issues.

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) clan support is diminishing all over S/C Somalia. This is due to the fact that even sub-sub clans are unable to support and assist. Whether or not an individual will get support depends on this person's position and reputation. Many people have lost the savings and they do not have the resources to assist. Assistance depends on the means one have to assist, and assistance may also depend on the personality of the person who is expected to assist. However, there are wealthy people who would not even assist members of his or her own family. The NGO made reference to a case in which a wealthy man would not even assist his own sister. In general a good man with access to resources would most likely assist family, clansmen, and in some cases even persons who are not members of the clan of the supporter. It was added that a person from the diaspora who did not support his or her family or sub-clan while abroad cannot expect to get any support from his or her family should he or she return to Somalia. Of course, such matters will also depend on individual circumstances.

Regarding clan affiliation and security an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that one would not expect protection of his or her own clan. It is only at the sub-sub clan level one may expect protection. This means that if you are Hawiye Haber Gedir Sa'ad you can only expect to be protected by Sa'ad sub-sub clan, not Hawiye in general. Within most of the sub-sub clans there is often a dominant person, this could be a warlord, or a former warlord, a DC or someone who has become a wealthy businessman. It is very important for anyone in need of support and

protection of his or her sub-sub clan that he or she is not involved in a dispute or disagreement with this dominant person. It was added that a poor person will always have to keep a low profile, if not such a person will not be protected or otherwise assisted by his or her sub-sub clan.

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) the majority of the population in Mogadishu are Abgal from the Hawiye clan. The districts of Bondheere, Shibis, Karan, Abdiaziz and Yaqshid are Abgal dominated while Hodan district is dominated by the Habr Gedir sub-clans Sa'ad and Eyr. The DC of Hodan is Eyr. However, all clans are represented in Mogadishu but clans such as Rahanweyne, Isak and Darod are to be considered as 'guests' in Mogadishu and members of these clans will need to seek protection from the Abgal clans. Visitors from Hargeisa will also need protection when they come to Mogadishu to do business. However, the international NGO added that al-Shabaab does not target persons only because of their clan affiliation. Killings are not a clan issue any longer, but al-Shabaab always ensure that someone it wants to kill will be killed by members of the victims own sub-clan.

A representative of an international organization stated that the traditional [clan] system is still there and has always been there, but the process of selecting MPs affected this system negatively. Some clan leaders, who were chosen to be part of the election of members of parliament, were bribed. This has led to discontent among several clans and sub-clans who have expressed a desire to have new clan leaders appointed.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (C) explained that no one is being killed in Mogadishu because of one's clan affiliation. Even persons whose clans were supportive of al-Shabaab are not at risk of being killed just because of their clan affiliation. The groups most supportive of al-Shabaab was the minority groups. It was added that there are no feelings of revenge or personal scores related to this fact. Even persons who themselves were supporters or members of al-Shabaab are not at risk of being persecuted for these reasons. People are now happy with those fighters who defect from al-Shabaab.

Regarding the clan system and conflict resolution an international NGO working in Gedo explained that conflicts are settled through the clan elders at the sub sub-clan level, which is the basis that provides security. Usually, people would not approach the police and the courts in order to settle disputes.

Regarding clan protection a local NGO in Mogadishu (A) stated that the unarmed marginalized groups have more fears than people belonging to the major clans and this will continue as long as the police and security forces are weak institutions. The marginalized groups in this context are the caste groups, i.e. the Midgan, Tumul, Benadiris and Jareer. The NGO also mentioned the Arabs still residing in the city as being part of the marginalized groups.

According to the local NGO in Mogadishu (A) the marginalized groups have less access to business opportunities, likewise to education and health facilities since they cannot pay for hospitalization

and medical services, school fees etc., and the saying “no one is crying for them”, characterizes their situation. The local NGO in Mogadishu (A) added that it is important to know that being marginalized is a relative thing in a Somali context. You can be a member of a major clan, but if you go to a place where your clan is outnumbered, you could be marginalized and a victim.

However, the local NGO in Mogadishu (A) explained that there are exceptions - for instance Marehan which is a minority in Mogadishu today, but they are in a different position than other outnumbered clans in the capital. The Marehan returned to Mogadishu after the Arta conference in 2000. They were the political elite during the Siad Barre era, they were known and had connections and ties, they owned hotels and businesses, and they still have ties with the Hawiye clans for instance through marriages. Members of the Marehan clan who had many difficulties in Mogadishu years ago are coming back to Mogadishu to reclaim property and there are also Marehan members who are now hotel owners.

The local NGO in Mogadishu (A) also explained that clans support al-Shabaab because their home area is occupied by al-Shabaab, otherwise they wouldn't. But this support does not imply they are sympathetic towards al-Shabaab. What one also needs to know is that that clans are divided by different interests; some support the AMISOM and would cooperate with them, others support the government or al-Shabaab or there are the business people and the political groups. The clans today are subdivided into sub sub-clans - each with different interests. It was added that there is no clan which is supporting al-Shabaab as a clan and no clan in Somalia is victim of retaliation for being perceived as an al-Shabaab supporter.

Regarding clan affiliation an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) stated that there are no reasons for anyone in Mogadishu to flee the country and seek asylum abroad because of one's clan affiliation. People and government officials in general do not have a negative perception of people whose clan or sub-clan previously supported al-Shabaab.

Those who could claim asylum today are mostly prominent, profiled individuals, and journalists. This also includes persons working for civil societies' organizations and the government. An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) explained that no one is targeted by al-Shabaab or the authorities because of clan affiliation.

4.2 Access to justice, police and mobile courts

Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, stated that the courts in S/C Somalia, including in Mogadishu are not functioning. There has been no positive change in the functioning of the courts in Mogadishu compared to February 2012. The courts are still corrupt and ordinary people do not make use of the justice system.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) stated that there is no justice in S/C Somalia and nowhere to report violations. In al-Shabaab controlled areas there are no lawyers and it was added that you are at risk being killed by al-Shabaab if there is suspicion that you have any kind of affiliation with the government or AMISOM. Al-Shabaab can easily undertake assassinations.

According to a representative of an international organization the Judiciary is the weakest and most corrupt institution in Somalia. The Head of the Supreme Court and his subordinates hold their positions solely to enrich themselves. It was added that “You will not find any Somali in Mogadishu who will trust any existing court in Mogadishu” and if you find one that goes to the courts, it is because he wants to buy a judgment for his own benefit. A telling example is how one and the same court may make two different judgements in one and the same case.

When asked if victims of rape have the opportunity to seek assistance and justice a local NGO in Mogadishu (C) stated that the courts are corrupted and it is the norm that perpetrators are released they day after or shortly after they have been detained. There are however some local NGOs in Mogadishu that assist rape victims, including the local NGO in Mogadishu (C) and Elman Peace and Human Rights Center in Mogadishu.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) confirmed that the justice system is thoroughly corrupted. One would only go to an Islamic Court, i.e. Imam Court/Sharia Court. In these courts both parties involved in a dispute are represented and the courts are independent. In Mogadishu there are two such courts, one in Bakara near the Black Sea area and one in Waberi. Both of these courts were established because many returned to these areas, and the need was there. Before al-Shabaab took control of Mogadishu, i.e. when the ICU ruled Mogadishu there were Sharia Courts all over Mogadishu. The NGO considered that today there is an increasing need for the reintroduction of Sharia courts as people would prefer to approach an Imam whenever they seek justice. The Imam will call in witnesses as well as the other part in a dispute. Then the Imam will make a preliminary ruling, but if one of the parties is not satisfied with his ruling the Imam will continue until a suitable solution has been found.

The international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) added that until more Sharia courts are established in Mogadishu one will have to seek redress through one’s own sub-sub clan. However, many elders are being increasingly corrupt and the only reliable option is to seek support from prominent, good people inside one’s own sub clan.

Tony Burns, SAACID - Australia had never heard of or seen the mobile courts mentioned in a report by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) from September this year⁷. Burns explained that he believed that mobile courts do not exist in reality. However, he added that it is a UNDP initiative, but that it is not real and no one has ever heard of the functioning of these courts.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) stated that it had never heard of mobile courts in Mogadishu. If such courts exist and function in Mogadishu the staff members of the NGO would have told about it.

⁷ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A.HRC.21.36_en_only.pdf

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) was asked about the latest UN report from OHCHR from September 2012, [which] describes mobile courts operating within Mogadishu, specifically in some IDP-settlements. However, the international NGO stated that no one has seen or heard about these courts (the only known ones are the military courts, high court and Benadir Region Court), so this is a fabrication from the UN, according to the international NGO working in S/C Somalia. It was added that the only functioning courts are the military courts, including mobile military courts.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA (e-mail correspondence 3 and 4 December 2012) explained that the mobile courts in Mogadishu seem to function.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA (e-mail correspondence 3 and 4 December 2012) explained that the work with the new institutions, i.e. the ministries has begun and UNDP, UNICEF and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have started engaging very strongly. UNDP does a lot of work with the parliament in training and capacity building. A lot of work is now starting with the justice sector by UNDP - judges are in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for training as we speak.

The existing justice system cannot provide fair trial to anyone; neither is there access to justice through the police, according to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B). The system is generally very corrupt and you would only use it if you have money and wish to buy a verdict. Impunity is widespread, and police officers guilty of crimes are neither arrested nor charged. There are no Sharia courts functioning, so marriages are performed by sheikhs.

Regarding access to justice and the judicial system Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA stated that it should be a number one priority to protect judges. Judges are at high risk of being targeted and in this connection it is imperative to protect and secure the establishment of rule and law as well as other governmental institutions. This is a key issue.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) explained that access to justice in Mogadishu depends on who you are. For example in the district of Wajir [Wadajir] there are two former warlords who identify anyone entering the district and if someone cannot be identified he or she will be arrested and you cannot expect a fair trial. It was added that people from the diaspora who wish to reclaim their property can go to court, but whether or not they can expect justice depends on who you are and whether or not you are able to pay for a favourable judgement.

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) other major challenges facing Somalis and Somali government are the lack of services and an incompetent and corrupted judiciary.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) explained that a major challenge for ordinary people today is insecurity and protection and people don't look upon the police and security forces as their protectors since police officers are responsible for committing crimes including looting and rapes.

According to Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu civilians do not usually or innately turn to the police, because the police are not trusted and cases are not being investigated, and they cannot give any protection, so it's better not to tell.

According to a UN agency government soldiers committing crimes against women enjoy impunity and the military courts in Mogadishu do not accept to deal with cases related GBV.

The UN agency emphasized that the main challenges facing ordinary people in Mogadishu is the lack of a functioning justice system, unemployment, i.e. a lack of job opportunities and property disputes, i.e. conflicts over land and houses.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (A) explained that marginalized groups have difficulties in getting a fair trial since strength in the sense of numbers and political influence is important in relation to getting a fair trial – if one can talk about fair trial for anyone in the justice system today.

An international organization explained that there are abuses committed by the SNAF and affiliated militias. These violations include looting and harassments. These are matters that people still fear and the violations are more linked to lack of law and order than to conflict. It was added that there are significantly fewer violations committed by AMISOM now, than was the case in the preceding years.

According to an international organization, people in Mogadishu are not afraid to report human rights violations committed by the authorities and allied forces. When someone feels his or her rights are being violated he or she would speak out to a local NGO. There are a number of local NGOs in Mogadishu which are very active regarding human rights. However, when violations have been committed by al-Shabaab people are afraid to report such incidents to local NGOs. Al-Shabaab is still present in Mogadishu and staff of the international organization in Mogadishu has noted that people are unwilling to speak about or complain about al-Shabaab. People are still afraid of al-Shabaab.

4.2.1 Risk of double jeopardy

Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, had not heard of double jeopardy being an issue in Somalia. However, there is only a risk of double jeopardy if the matter is a clan issue, i.e. if the crime committed was against another Somali.

Regarding the risk of double jeopardy an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that courts in S/C Somalia, including Mogadishu are not functioning. When asked what would happen to a Somali after he or she returns after having committed rape against a Somalia woman while abroad the NGO stated that the rapist would be unable to live a normal life in Somalia. However, a rapist might be able to survive if he joins a criminal gang as he will need to be able to defend himself. A rapist without weapons will be at risk of revenge killing. If rape is committed against a non-Somalia abroad the rapist will not be at risk of revenge killing and there will be no other actions taken against him.

Regarding double jeopardy an international organization stated that it has never encountered such cases. However, should it occur, the international organization would most likely not know about it.

4.3 Perception of former al-Shabaab fighters

Regarding the perception of former al-Shabaab fighters Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, stated that he had not heard any negative feelings among the population. People recognize that al-Shabaab was not that bad, especially when it came to property and land issues. It is not a terrible sin to have been with al-Shabaab. It was added that it is on a higher level members of al-Shabaab have a reason to feel threatened. There does not seem to be revenge against former ordinary al-Shabaab fighters by members from the general population.

When asked if children who have left al-Shabaab areas would be at risk of being suspected as spying for al-Shabaab a UN agency explained that children, including girls from al-Shabaab areas, are in a difficult situation, they fall in between two chairs. They are regarded as spies by the authorities and should UN successfully locate their parents – and they would most likely be located in al-Shabaab areas – they cannot be returned to them. The reason for this problem is the fact that the parents would risk that they will be perceived by al-Shabaab as spying for the government. In addition such children would most likely be executed by al-Shabaab if they are returned to their parents.

The UN agency explained that some of the previous child soldiers for al-Shabaab are provided alternative care. Many of these children are deeply traumatized. Only little has been published on the situation of these children as they may be endangered by being focused on.

4.4 Youth returned from the West

Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu explained that over the past years it has worked with a great number of youth that have been deported or sent forcibly to Somalia for a ‘cultural reconnect’ by their families from European countries, Canada and the United States of America (USA) that have joined clan based militias, al-Shabaab or the national forces.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu explained that most recently, Mogadishu is experiencing a growing gang culture, many of them consisting of youth deported from the West or sent forcibly to Somalia for a ‘cultural reconnect’ by their families. Somalia is currently in a recovery phase but with still so many, unpredictable variables in the air that could change the situation for the worst at any given moment. With the high influx of Somalis returning voluntarily or forcibly, there is a great cultural and social disconnect that could be detrimental to any prospected peace for the nation. Mogadishu, the capital city, remains the hub and over the years has been a ‘dumping ground’ for the ‘failed diaspora’ or those deported for serious crimes. Often there is a language barrier, a different culture adopted abroad, drug and alcohol dependencies, no immediate family support structure, unemployment, hopelessness; and a very high stigma attached to those that have been deported that prohibits a social integration.

These youths, very much fascinated by the gun culture and the easy access to weapons, become spoilers of peace according to Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu. Two months prior a group of four intoxicated youth from the United Kingdom (UK) shot at a mini-bus transporting civilians, others are working at illegal check-points collecting money from all passing-by vehicles and holding up at gun-point those who don't comply.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu added that the culture shock of deportations to a country most have not grown up in is often a lonely, terrifying and hopeless traumatic experience; but with the mandatory transition period it can be an exciting opportunity. For most deportees, being sent to Somalia is comparable to a death sentence, the end of their world as they know it; and therefore lose all inhibitions to become constructive members of society; with the transitional center, the youth will have a new outlook, the end of one life, but the beginning of a new, more meaningful life where they can contribute to the recovery of their nation.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu explained that the transitional center is an initiative it has not yet established but are working on due to the situation at hand of deported youths. It is an important center to establish to counteract some of the uprising insecurities associated with deported youths being 'dumped' in Mogadishu.

Keeping youth in state prisons [abroad] is very expensive and with the improved security situation and accessibility in Somalia; for those facing deportations, it is important for embassies around the world to go about deporting youth in a safe way that does not hinder their growth and development. The transitional center can be that safe alternative, according to Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA (e-mail correspondence 3 and 4 December 2012) explained that UNICEF conducted a three day workshop with the health departments from the regions and is now beginning to work on child protection. The minister of interior has been appointed as the counterpart for humanitarians.

5 Humanitarian issues in Mogadishu

5.1 Vulnerable groups

Aside from the urban poor [see below] an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) explained that there are two groups of people which are most vulnerable in Mogadishu. These two groups are either marginalized or exploited:

- Marginalized: some belong to minority/marginalized groups such as Midgan, Gaboye, Tumul and Jareer. In Bondheere as well as in Shangani you will find areas where Jareer are living.
- Exploited: the Reer Hamar/Benadiri are not considered marginalized, neither are the Reer Brava. They are exploited but not marginalized. Compared to other clans there are fewer Reer Hamar returning to Mogadishu.

It was added by the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) that the position of the minorities is still precarious in the sense that you would need protection against for instance criminals. If you are rich this is easy to solve, if you are poor it's different. It is also important to note that even if you belong to a major Somali clan, but being outnumbered in a specific area (like being Majerteen in Mogadishu today), you would need some sort of protection or arrangement to do business or engage a profile activity. On the other hand being a Hawiye implies that you are safe, since Mogadishu has become a Hawiye-dominated city.

The international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) explained that many of the marginalized or exploited groups previously joined or became supporters of al-Shabaab. That has been their possibility of getting a voice and power. However, members of these groups are not targeted today just because they belong to such groups.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (C) explained that the most vulnerable groups of people in Mogadishu are the IDP children and youth and this is due to malnutrition and lack of medical treatment. They are not more vulnerable due to their clan affiliations; their vulnerability is mainly due to the fact that they are young and IDPs. In addition the local NGO in Mogadishu (C) also mentioned rural people, especially farmers who have become IDPs. Rural people are still coming to Mogadishu as IDPs. Finally, there are also those people in Mogadishu who lost everything they had due to the war in the city. They are mostly living as IDPs in Mogadishu.

5.1.1 Conditions for IDPs and urban poor Mogadishu

Peter Klansoe, DRC stated that IDPs as well as other poor people do not enjoy security to the same extent as others. IDPs will often have to pay for their security. They are often without support and they cannot turn to the authorities for security. In this regard there are no substantial changes during the last six months. Peter Klansoe added that with regard to DRC's operations and position in Mogadishu there are no changes since February 2012.

The Danish Refugee Council is providing cash relief to approximately 20.000 households [in Mogadishu], according to Peter Klansoe, DRC. Each household receives 120 USD per month in cash relief. It was added that the cash relief program makes it possible for many recipients to begin to reestablish themselves in Mogadishu. Another consequence of this program is that one can notice a new consumption pattern in Mogadishu. In this connection one can notice a substantial increase in the payment of school fees. It was added that the cash relief program is based on the needs of the recipients; however, if the program was 100 % clan based one would see a lot of trouble among the clans involved in the program. When asked if the DRC is under pressure when it comes to relief Peter Klansoe explained that the DRC is under serious pressure but added that this is almost always the norm in Somalia.

According to an international organization sexual violence is a major concern in IDP camps, but the organization does not have any figures on these violations. In general IDPs are the most vulnerable.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (C) stated that presently there are not less than 20 rapes per day in the IDP camps as well at checkpoints. However, the vast majority of these crimes are committed in the IDP camps. Protection and survival is a major concern to many women in Mogadishu.

Lack of job opportunities in Mogadishu mean that many people are falling outside the social systems and they risk becoming marginalized, according to a UN agency. UN now and then sees poor people trying to get into IDP camps in order for them to get access to services in these camps. In contrast to IDPs the local populations are most likely better protected by their own sub-clan. The IDPs often live in mixed settlements which mean that they only have limited clan protection.

Regarding property disputes it was emphasized by the UN agency that there are a lot of unsettled disputes in Mogadishu as well as in other parts of S/C Somalia. There is no justice system which can assist people in solving property issues in an impartial manner. Land and house property is becoming increasingly valuable and anyone who own or control property occupied by IDPs and who have armed guards will demand payment from the IDPs on their land. Thus IDPs have become big business where landowners as well as gatekeepers earn huge amounts of money by rent and 'protection' paid by IDPs. Those IDPs who cannot pay their rent and protection fees risk being beaten or raped.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu explained that GBV is equally widespread in host communities and settlements for displaced persons, and it is endemic in Mogadishu. Rape victims are contacting Elman Peace and Human Rights Center on a daily basis, and each month there is at least 30 cases. Elman Peace and Human Rights Center has a safe house in Mogadishu where women can be protected, but this is only a short time solution since they don't have capacity to let the women stay for long.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, explained that according to International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) there are approximately 400.000 IDPs in the Mogadishu. However, Kilian Kleinschmidt

estimated the figure would rather be somewhere between 300.000 and 400.000 IDPs. There are no exact figures in the number of IDPs. Many IDPs have been displaced several times. Approximately 15% of the IDPs are originating in Mogadishu, according to figures from ICRC. Kilian Kleinschmidt added:

- The number of IDPs in Mogadishu have increased during the last months. This increase is due to the fighting that took place in the Afgoye Corridor as well as in other locations in the spring of 2012. In addition a small number of IDPs have recently been evicted from private houses and plots in the inner-city of Mogadishu. Recently OCHA found a new IDP settlement in the district of Daynile and all IDPs were evicted from the above mentioned private plots and houses.
- For some time not a single IDP have been evicted from public buildings or land in Mogadishu after successful intervention by the UN Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC).
- In addition to Somali IDPs former Ethiopian refugees remain in some IDP settlements, whose presence in Mogadishu dates back to the early 1990's.

Regarding the urban poor and IDPs Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, explained that it is not possible to distinguish between these two groups as IDPs are not found in closed camps. Humanitarian assistance from the international community goes to poor people in need, irrespectively whether they are urban poor or IDPs. It was added that there are IDP camps in Mogadishu which should be considered as fake camps. In addition there are camps where the IDPs are Bantu people. These IDPs are the worst off IDPs in Mogadishu. They are literally living from garbage and they have less access to assistance as they are very poor and marginalized. In general Kilian Kleinschmidt considered that IDP camps are simply higher concentration of people and not IDP camps in traditional thinking. IDPs are often people who do not hold land titles and who are living as squatters.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA (e-mail correspondence 3 and 4 December 2012) confirmed that DRC has 20.000 families on a cash scheme, but added that various organizations - including Arab and Turkish organizations - have similar schemes and it may add up to approximately 100.000 families. However, this figure is not verified.

No one knows how many urban poor there are in Mogadishu according to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B). However unemployment is high and many families fall into the category of extreme poverty. Some of the urban poor moved into Mogadishu in the early 1990s.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, confirmed that there are IDP camps in which gatekeepers are denying the IDPs freedom of movement, i.e. they are not permitted to leave the camps.

An estimated 350.000 are internally displaced in the city [Mogadishu] according to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B), and most people get by because of remittances from relatives

abroad and small trade as well as some assistance from NGOs and international organizations. In addition people share the little they have.

The international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) stated that an improvement of humanitarian aid in Mogadishu has taken place since February 2012. Checkpoints are no longer obstructing transportation of humanitarian aid.

According to Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, there have been some recent evictions of IDPs in Mogadishu. He also referred to the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SMEG) report which states that there are examples of gatekeepers preventing IDPs from leaving their camps. The SMEG report also states that IDPs will have to pay 3 US \$ for a plot in the camps and a percentage of aid given to the IDPs will have to be given to the gatekeepers.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) explained that there are different groups of IDPs and some have been IDPs for twenty years, some have been displaced by the more recent war, others are newly displaced due to the drought last year.

An estimation is at least 300.000 IDPs today, but there is a lot of conflicting figures and there is no registration of the IDPs. The IDPs are either living in big settlements or in minor settlements. Some get support while others don't.

The majority of the IDPs are agro pastoralists; mainly May-speaking from Bay and Bakool, the Juba regions, Lower Shabelle, and some from Middle Shabelle, and even some from main clans.

The main problem the IDPs are facing in Mogadishu is the gatekeepers at the camps. They are keeping the IDPs as hostages since they are making money on them, the rents the IDPs have to pay for staying in the settlement, and by having to share any income they might have. So being a source of income people who wish to return home are stopped by the gatekeepers, and there is no protection for IDPs in Mogadishu neither from clans nor authorities. However, IDPs living in an area or settlement in which their own clan is a majority may expect some protection.

The camps or settlements are located in various parts of the city and in all the 16 districts there is a DC working independently of the government. These DCs have their own militia who control their area and it is difficult to get access to the camps. Any organisation which wants to do projects of some kind in the camps has to get permission from the DCs. Even the government forces don't go to the camps.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) stated that child recruitment to the SNAF takes place on a much smaller scale today than before because of the focus from the international society. But it is easy to recruit especially among the IDPs since there are no schools in the camps and life is difficult.

5.2 Public reconstruction of houses, schools, health care institutions and other urban infrastructures

A representative of an international organization stated that what have not changed [in Mogadishu] are the formal institutional structures. The government still cannot provide better security, it still does not establish or run schools, hospitals or do road construction. Everything that happens in Mogadishu is created by Somalis, but not by the government.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) explained that during Siad Barre's time there were 90 schools in Mogadishu. Today there are no public schools. All schools are run by different Islamic groups or charities. The Turkish aid organisations have helped rebuild some schools. The lack of non-religious schools has made people from the south, mainly Hawiye families who can afford, to send their children to Hargeisa in Somaliland where they can attend public schools. These children often stay with relatives in Hargeisa.

The international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) stated that there is no university in Afgoye. It was added that there are no schools in the IDP camps and IDP children do not attend schools. The majority of children in S/C Somalia, including Mogadishu do not attend school. If these children are [not] offered anything they may look to al-Shabaab.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) explained that most hospitals in Mogadishu are private so patients need to pay. Ordinary people will normally be able to pay for treatment at private hospitals, but poor people are unable to do this. In general health services are in bad shape in terms of low standard, lack of basic equipment as x-rays or scanning machines, lack of medication or pirate medications. There are no possibilities of cancer treatment or treatment of heart conditions, so only people who can afford to travel to for example Nairobi or Dubai, and who can pay for private care, will be able to have advanced treatment. A major problem in this respect is the difficulty that Somalis face when they apply for a visa. The Turkish aid organisations have supported the reconstruction of the Digfer hospital. Most cases treated in the hospitals of Mogadishu are war wounds. The international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A) brought in [doctors from abroad] to work at Benadir hospital on a volunteer basis, and they were shocked by what they saw. It was added that IDPs have some access to health care centres and that ICRC runs a hospital in Medina.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) stated that the lack of schools and poor quality in existing ones especially in the northern parts of the city [Mogadishu] is a serious problem. Besides, most functioning schools are private and the cost per month per child is 20 to 25 USD. Since most families have quite a few children this is hardly an option. 95 % (rough estimate) of people in Mogadishu are unemployed and they cannot afford to send their children to school and in addition they need their children to do some work

The international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) added that there are no public services in the city [Mogadishu]; all there is are run by private interests. However, there are a few mother-child health care centres. There are neither public housing schemes nor private investors building

apartments or living areas. The construction works in Mogadishu are mainly business related, and private people are rebuilding their homes.

Peter Klansoe, DRC explained that in Mogadishu there is an extensive reconstruction especially houses including infrastructures. This development is a real positive process and many people in Mogadishu have very positive expectations about the future. Today there are many more international organizations present in Mogadishu than at any other time during the civil war. Some districts are more developed and better to live in than other districts. There is now a large scale project concerning rehabilitation of houses, and there is a trend towards more long term projects in contrast to the previous short term projects. However the needs are enormous.

5.2.1 Services offered by local authorities, including district commissioners

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, explained that there are no public services available to the citizens of Mogadishu. The need for public services is becoming more pressing as the population is growing. There is an increasing rural – urban migration as most IDPs prefer to stay in Mogadishu for security reasons. In addition many people from rural areas are looking for job opportunities in the city. Kilian Kleinschmidt considered that it is important to strengthen the capacity of the DC's offices in order for them to [be] able to deliver public services. It was added that there are a number of DCs who are very cooperative while other must be considered as warlords.

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) there are no social services offered to people in S/C Somalia, including in Mogadishu. The local authorities do not even have their own offices or buildings. Only the district of Hamar Weyne has administrative offices, but still no public services. In general people in need of assistance only have their family or wealthy individuals to turn to.

5.3 Real estate prices, house rent prices

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) explained that the prices of land [in Mogadishu] have skyrocketed. Since February 2012 prices of land has increased three to four times. A small plot of land with the size 13x13 meters was recently sold for 40.000 US \$ (in the Medina/Wadajir area). Last year the prize for the same plot was 15.000 – 18.000 US \$.

6 Freedom of movement

6.1 Freedom of movement in Mogadishu and its surroundings, and other areas under government/AMISOM control.

Freedom of movement in Mogadishu has improved considerably since February 2012 according to Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA. There are no longer visible checkpoints in the city center of Mogadishu. However, there are a lot of 'invisible' checkpoints, but even these do not affect the freedom of movement for UN agencies. Today there are only checkpoints in the outlying areas of Mogadishu. Kilian Kleinschmidt had seen some checkpoints in the districts of Hurriwa, Yaqshid, Dharkenley and Wadajir.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, added that in general people are moving freely around the city center, even in the evenings. However, before the café-bombing [in August 2012] people were moving around at night, but this has changed since the café attack.

Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, confirmed that the number of checkpoints in Mogadishu has been reduced considerably [since February 2012]. However, it is common to see a person from the local militia at important street corners for him to check if someone unknown is passing by. These are the so-called 'invisible' checkpoints.

A representative of an international organization explained that there are checkpoints in Mogadishu and one cannot exclude the possibility that al-Shabaab disguised as soldiers are manning them. IDs that show you work for an international organization, if you are a government official or a MP, put you in a dangerous position.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) explained that there are still checkpoints [in Mogadishu], but these are mainly in place to tax the trucks going into the city. Sometimes disagreements occur at the checkpoints and only a month ago (in mid-September) a person was killed in Medina in such circumstances. The checkpoints can be manned by either government soldiers, local militia, i.e. in Medina the DC has a strong militia of his own, or other armed persons.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (C) emphasized that freedom of movement in Mogadishu for women has been improved considerably since February 2012. There are only few remaining checkpoints in Mogadishu and the risk of violations against women at these checkpoints is decreasing. Those violations that occur against women at checkpoints are mostly committed by government soldiers. They are poorly trained and some of them are former al-Shabaab fighters, and this adds to the problem, according to the local NGO in Mogadishu (C).

Regarding freedom of movement for women in S/C Somalia the local NGO in Mogadishu (C) explained that female passengers traveling in a bus may be at risk of extortion at daytime while the [they] may be at risk of being raped at nighttime when they pass a checkpoint. There are reports that government soldiers have committed such crimes at checkpoints near Afgoye and Merka. It could

be dangerous for women to travel from Mogadishu to those cities. Rapes are also common in IDP camps.

According to the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) people have now less fear at checkpoints in Mogadishu than a year ago. Only very few incidents occur at the checkpoints and these are mostly related to investigations. However, at times soldiers at checkpoints may take one's cell phone. There has been an improvement in freedom of movement in Mogadishu since February 2012.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) stated that today people are moving more freely around in Mogadishu than during the previous five to six years. People are now going to the Bakara market. However the livestock market looks like an empty space. The livestock market moved to Wardhigley a long time ago.

Tony Burns, SAACID – Australia, explained that freedom of movement in Mogadishu is relative and must be seen in a broader perspective and context. From 1991 – 1996 you had the green line dividing Mogadishu between the Abgal and the Haber Gedir. However by 1999 and onwards people could mix and move freely across the city. This was the case throughout the warlord period until the end of the UIC period in December 2006. From December 2006 onward, the Ethiopian intervention made movement much more difficult, back to clan based geography. Today's situation is still not comparable to the 2005/2006 situation according to Burns. Burns added that there has been a gradual improvement in the freedom of movement since August 2011.

There are far less checkpoints in Mogadishu than in February 2012, and the existing ones tend to be government checkpoints according to Tony Burns, SAACID – Australia. It was added that the government checkpoints are by definition, legitimised by the government, but harassment continues to occur at these checkpoints. Besides, the checkpoints today seem to be more mobile/ephemeral in the sense that the soldiers and others move around and stop cars and minivans. Those who don't pay risk being killed, and there continues to be a sense of total impunity throughout the city. Al-Shabaab is also extorting money from local businesses. There continue to be places where government soldiers never go to. For instance neither AMISOM nor the government forces have been inside Wadajir, which is strictly controlled by the DC and his militia. Although he is a former warlord, he is paying his men and thus providing security for the local inhabitants. The locals are very supportive of the DC and no other DC is capable to do what he does at this time.

People are moving freely around in Mogadishu today, and they feel safer today than for the past twenty years according to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A). There is access to most of Mogadishu's 16 districts. People are also moving back and forth to the Afgoye-corridor depending on the situation. A major challenge for the government is to improve security and if this becomes successful one will see a lot of positive changes and developments. People need protection, a functioning justice system and a functioning police force.

Regarding freedom of movement an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that the current checkpoints in Mogadishu are not as unsafe as previously. The checkpoints are now more relaxed and people are free to move wherever they like. According to the NGO this is due to the fact that the NSA is present everywhere in Mogadishu. NSA is working hard to prevent attacks by al-Shabaab.

Regarding security and civilian casualties in Mogadishu since February 2012 Saferworld stated that in general one can register an improved security situation and some kind of a decrease in civilian casualties. However, Saferworld added that one has to define security. Security in Somalia is a relative term and the representative of Saferworld explained that he was in Mogadishu in the beginning of October 2012, and even if he knows the city well, he wasn't feeling secure in many circumstances and he was not feeling free to move around in some places, and added that the fear is still there.

6.1.1 Are civilians from other areas of S/C Somalia and people from the diaspora free to move to Mogadishu?

Regarding freedom of movement for civilians in other areas of S/C Somalia than Mogadishu Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, explained that there are no formal restrictions in the freedom of movement. However, Ayaki Ito believes freedom of movement has become more difficult in S/C Somalia due the present military situation. Ayaki Ito explained that UNHCR are organizing transports with IDPs returning from Garowe and Galkayo to Baidoa. These transports have become more complicated because of both army and al-Shabaab checkpoints and the need to change transporters in order to be allowed to pass through some areas, plus the risk of highway robbery along the road from Mogadishu to Burhakaba, which in spite of what AMISOM claims, is no man's land, where Hawiye militia is robbing travelers. There are also three al-Shabaab checkpoints along this road.

7 Return to Mogadishu

7.1 Who return to Mogadishu?

According to Peter Klansoe, DRC the number of returnees from the diaspora and from refugee camps in neighboring countries to S/C Somalia, including Mogadishu is not yet high. However there are no exact figures on the number of returnees. Many Somali refugees are staying in the Dadaab Refugee Camp in Kenya. There are approximately half a million Somali refugees in Kenya, 200.000 in Ethiopia and 200.000 in Yemen. The vast majority of these refugees have not returned and they are not yet ready to give up their status as refugees. Refugees are not dying in the refugee camps abroad, but they are facing many hardships, including a very low level of services available to them. Despite these hardships they are not prepared to return to S/C Somalia.

Peter Klansoe, DRC explained that returnees to Mogadishu comprise people from the diaspora who are claiming and securing property (land, plots and houses), making investments, and many are positioning themselves politically and economically. It was emphasized that the majority of these returnees are citizens or passport holders of Middle Eastern countries (especially Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar) or from western countries, including USA, Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, UK, and Canada. The majority belong to the elite. They are mostly well off people and some are well educated as well, who are not returning on a permanent basis. There are also others – for instance Danish citizens – who wish to assist, and the UNDP Quest - programme is in place hiring diaspora in order to support the public sector in Mogadishu. In addition many of the returnees are economically supporting local communities in Mogadishu as well in other locations in S/C Somalia. However, most returns to Mogadishu are not yet on a permanent basis. Although many returnees are prepared to assist their fellow men in Mogadishu they also want safety and security. These concerns are somehow similar to the situation in Somaliland in the 1990s when people from the diaspora returned in large numbers to Hargeisa and other locations in Somaliland. It was added that there are many returning from the diaspora to Mogadishu who are optimistic and this is an indication that many have a firm belief in the future.

Peter Klansoe, DRC explained that the perception of returnees among residents of Mogadishu is generally positive, but of course you do have the classical attitude towards the returnees among some along the lines that they don't understand the situation since they have been away for a long time etc.

Approximately 70% of all returnees from the diaspora are from the USA, according to Peter Klansoe, DRC. Many of these are well educated and well off. Thus, the increasing presence of people from the diaspora in Mogadishu is putting some pressure on the traditional stakeholders in the city. Peter Klansoe considered it positive that the new President of Somalia is not from the diaspora, and added that it is important that not too many people from the diaspora are occupying prominent positions within politics.

To summarize, Peter Klansoe, DRC explained that you have people returning from the diaspora and you also have a few thousand refugees returning from neighbouring states. Regarding IDPs this is a very complex group consisting of people who have been displaced many times as well as rather recent displaced. Regarding return of IDPs to Mogadishu Peter Klansoe stated that some IDPs are returning to the city. These IDPs are being assisted and they are provided with a return package. However, the number of returning IDPs is not yet high. The focus is still to support IDPs as IDPs.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) stated that the optimism in the capital is also reflected in the fact that planes coming from Hargeisa are fully booked by people wishing to do business or to establish themselves permanently in Mogadishu.

People from the diaspora are also returning, some for business and investment purposes, and others with political ambitions. There are also a few who are looking at the possibilities of bringing their families back home according to the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B).

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) explained that if someone from the diaspora needs a place to live he or she will have to organize this through relatives, or you would have to rent. However prices are extremely high. A small villa with maximum four bedrooms would go for 200 to 400 USD a month. A large house would be let for 5000 to 6000 USD a month. Altogether, people don't return to Mogadishu unless they have something to return to, i.e. a family that can assist, support and give you shelter.

It was added by the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) that it is also important to note that 70 % (estimate) of reconstruction work is taking place in the safer areas of the city, and it is also in the safer areas roughly 2/3 of the population estimated at 1,5 million, are living. This has led to overcrowding in these areas.

A representative of an international organization explained that not only people from the diaspora have contributed to the reconstruction, but also people from Afgoye Corridor who returned home and needed to make a living. Somalis from Eastleigh, Nairobi have also moved resources to Mogadishu. Common to those coming from outside is that they have one foot out and one foot at home. This reflects optimism but also caution.

Regarding returnees a local NGO in Mogadishu (A) stated that business related returns are regarded as positive, whereas those who return with political ambitions are less popular since many feel that these are people who will not stay if things get difficult.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu explained that many locals also have the perception that diaspora youth have been connected to al-Shabaab, since there have been cases of people from Canada, the UK and other European countries returning to join al-Shabaab. Some of these youngsters have committed crimes abroad and they are often quite extreme, according to Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu.

7.2 Internally Displaced Persons

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that many IDPs who were previously located in IDP camps in the Afgoye Corridor have now returned to Mogadishu. In mid-October 2012 there were approximately 57.000 IDPs left in the Afgoye Corridor. Many of them are people who have lost their houses in Mogadishu or people who have built new houses in the corridor. But there are also IDPs remaining in the Afgoye Corridor who never had a house or lived in Mogadishu but they do not have the resources to return to their original home area. They find the conditions in the IDP camps in the Afgoye Corridor better than the alternatives. Some of these are Gaboye clan members originally from Somaliland. Others are Midgan.

7.3 Persons returning from abroad

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) explained that people returning from the diaspora will need to make sure that they have the support from their family, i.e. a father, mother, brother, sister and/or uncle and added that “you cannot count on your clan to support you”.

An international NGO working in Gedo emphasized that it is important people from the diaspora return to Somalia as they may be well educated and have useful skills as well as money. This, it is emphasized, can be important for nation building in Somalia.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (B) explained that during the months of June, July and August 2012 many people from the diaspora came back to Mogadishu. This increase in return was partly due to the summertime, when children are off from school. It was added that from June to October 2012 Turkish Airlines was fully booked on all its flights to Mogadishu. Many people are travelling in and out of Mogadishu and people believe in the security improvements that have taken place during the last 12 months.

Regarding the situation in Mogadishu it was stated by an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) that there are huge progresses taking place. People from the diaspora are returning with a hope. The emerging security developments in Mogadishu make people return rather quickly in order for them to become pioneers.

However, families with children are not yet coming back in any significant numbers, but the international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) was confident they will be coming back in increasing numbers if things still improve. One obstacle for families with children to return is that families abroad are not confident with the education system in Mogadishu. The pull factor for people returning is:

- Job opportunities within the government
- Job opportunities within the UN system
- Business opportunities
- Consultancy opportunities

Regarding opportunities for the individual returning to Mogadishu from abroad an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) stated that clan affiliation (and relatives) is very important, not only for security reasons but also for getting a job and get access to a livelihood. Today no one is returning to Mogadishu expecting to be supported by anyone. On the contrary, people returning from abroad are expected to be able to assist their close relatives; they are expected to have access to certain economic resources. Besides people who have stayed abroad or people interacting with foreigners or even talking a foreign language might be at risk of being harmed by al-Shabaab.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) stated that it is a prerequisite for stability and development in Somalia that the number of Somalis getting asylum abroad goes down dramatically. Those countries that deny asylum to Somalis are supporting the positive developments taking place in Somalia today.

According to Peter Klansoe, DRC it is too early to begin to return refugees to S/C Somalia from camps in neighboring countries like Kenya. However, it is appropriate to consider how a future return can take place.

8 Security issues at Mogadishu airport

8.1 Security at Mogadishu's international airport

Regarding security at Mogadishu's international airport Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, explained that there have been no attacks on the airport area during the last year. When asked when the last attack on the airport took place Kilian Kleinschmidt explained that there was a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) attack from Majo IDP camp on the airport in October [2011]. The airport is a safe area. However, recently two or three suspected al-Shabaab fighters were executed by the NSA near the airport.

An international organization stated that AMISOM controls Mogadishu's airport and the airport area and it has put up four checkpoints at the airport. Previously there had been a couple of incidents near the airport but the airport is a largely safe area and there was only one recent attack reported against the airport.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) stated that the area around the airport has not been the scene of clashes for a long time and the representative of the international NGO could not remember when the last attack on the airport took place, but it was a long time ago.

According to Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu there are no Black-lists at the airport and no control as such of people passing through the airport. There is limited control at the airport and people are admitted entry into the country based on a simple assurity [assurance] of a well-known person. There are very lenient regulations in place currently on access [to the airport] and control.

9 Issuance of documents by Somali authorities

9.1 Issuing authorities and types of documents

According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) passports are issued at the Immigration Office (which is under the Ministry of the Interior) located near the United Nations Common Compound (UNCC) and the airport. A passport costs between 80 and 100 USD.

It was added that other documents issued by the authorities are driver's licenses and school certificates.

According to Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA (e-mail correspondence 3 and 4 December 2012) there are no documents issued at all by the authorities in Somalia. Kilian Kleinschmidt referred to UNICEF who has explained that the agency wishes to address this with the new authorities in place.

Organizations and individuals consulted, date of consultations

A former editor of a Somali news agency, Nairobi. 18 October.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (A), Mogadishu. 23 October.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (B), Mogadishu. 21 October.

A local NGO in Mogadishu (C), Mogadishu. 21 October.

A representative of an international organization, Nairobi. 19 October.

A UN agency, Nairobi. 18 October.

An international NGO working in Gedo, Nairobi. 26 October.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (A), Nairobi. 22 October.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B), Mogadishu. 21 October.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C), Nairobi. 25 October.

An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D), Nairobi. 22 October.

An international organization, Nairobi. 25 October.

Ayaki Ito, Deputy Representative, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Somalia (UNHCR Somalia), Nairobi. 25 October.

Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, Mogadishu. 23 October.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Mogadishu. 23 October.

Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, e-mail correspondence 3 and 4 December.

Peter Klansoe, Regional Director, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Nairobi. 19 October.

Saferworld, Nairobi. 24 October.

Tony Burns, Director of Operations, SAACID⁸ – Australia, Nairobi. 24 October.

United Nations Department of Safety and Security – Somalia (UNDSS – Somalia), Nairobi. 25 October.

⁸ SAACID = *say-eed*, Somali, meaning 'to help'.

Abbreviations

AMISOM – African Union Mission in Somalia

ASWJ – Ahlu-Sunna Wal Jamaa

COI – Country of Origin Information

DC – District Commissioner

DHC – Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator

DIS – Danish Immigration Service

DRC – Danish Refugee Council

ENDF – Ethiopian National Defence Forces

EU – European Union

FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization

GBV – Gender Based Violence

HQ – Head Quarter

ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross

ICU – Islamic Courts United, also called Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)

IDP – Internally Displaced Person

IED – Improvised Explosive Device

INGO – International Non-Governmental Organization

IOM – International Organization for Migration

KDF – Kenyan Defence Forces

LA – Liberated Area

MP – Member of Parliament

MSR – Main Supply Route

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

NSA – National Security Agency, also called National Security Service Agency (NSSA)

OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHCHR – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade

S/C Somalia – South-Central Somalia

SAACID – *say-eed* (Somali, meaning 'to help')

SGBV – Sexual and Gender Based Violence

SMEG – Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group

SNAF – Somali National Armed Forces

SNG – Somali National Government

SNP – Somali National Police

SRGS – Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia

SVA – Shabelle Valley Alliance

TFG – Transitional Federal Government

ToR – Terms of References

UAE – United Arab Emirates

UIC – Union of Islamic Courts, also named Islamic Courts United (ICU)

UK – United Kingdom

UN – United Nations

UNCC – United Nations Common Compound

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNDSS – United Nations Department for Safety and Security

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund

UNMAS – United Nations Mine Action Service

UNPOS – United Nations Political Office for Somalia

UNSOA – United Nations Support Office for AMISOM

US – United States

USA – United States of America

USD – United States Dollars


WFP – World Food Programme

Annexes

Annex 1: Map of Somalia



Annex 2: Map of Mogadishu⁹



⁹ UNHCR. City Plan – Mogadishu. http://psugeo.org/Africa/DMS/Hard%20Copy%20Maps/Somalia_Mogadishu_city_plan.jpg