

SYRIEN

*Sikkerhed i Afrin, obligatorisk
selvforsvarstjeneste og SDF-
Rekruttering*



Udlændinge- og
Integrationsministeriet

Udlændingestyrelsen

© 2019 Udlændingestyrelsen

Udlændingestyrelsen
Ryesgade 53
2100 København Ø
Danmark

Tlf.: 35 36 66 00
nyidanmark.dk

Marts 2019

Alle rettigheder tilhører Udlændingestyrelsen.
Udgivelsen kan frit hentes på nyidanmark.dk
Udlændingestyrelsens udgivelser kan frit citeres med tydelig kildegengivelse.

Indhold

Begrebsliste/Forkortelser	2
Afgrænsning	3
1. Konflikt og kontrol i Syriens kurdiske områder	4
1.1. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)	4
1.2. Tyrkisk intervention	5
2. Afrin efter Operation Olive Branch	6
2.1. Civiles flugt fra kampene	6
2.2. Generel sikkerhed efter operationen	6
2.3. Ny administrationsstruktur	7
2.4. Fri bevægelighed	7
2.5. Plyndringer og ødelæggelser	7
2.6. Arbitrære arrestationer, tortur, kidnapninger og forsvindinger	8
3. Obligatorisk Selvforsvarstjeneste og YPG/SDF-rekruttering	9
3.1. Den obligatoriske selvforsvarstjenestes varighed	9
3.2. Rekruttering uden for de kurdiske majoritetsområder (SDF)	10
3.3. Kamphandlinger	10
3.4. Unddragelse og aftrædelse	11
3.5. Rekruttering til YPG og SDF	12
3.6. Rekruttering af mindreårige	14
Bibliografi	15

Begrebsliste/Forkortelser

HXP – Hezen Xweparastine

IED – improvised explosive device

IS – Islamisk Stat

PKK – Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê

PYD – Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat

SDF – Syrian Democratic Forces

YPG – Yekîneyên Parastina Gel

YPJ – Yekîneyên Parastina Jin

Afgrænsning


Udlændingestyrelsens Landedokumentation har indsamlet information om situationen i det tidligere kurdisk-kontrollerede område, Afrin, samt om den Obligatoriske Selvforsvarstjeneste og rekruttering til kurdiskledede styrker. Notatet er baseret udelukkende på åbne skriftlige kilder, dvs. nyhedsmedier og rapporter fra diverse organisationer samt enkelte akademiske kilder.

1. Konflikt og kontrol i Syriens kurdiske områder

I borgerkrigens første år, mens det syriske regime og opposition var optaget af at bekriige hinanden i andre dele af landet, konsoliderede kurdiske styrker kontrol over store dele af Nordsyrien. Uden konfrontation med regimet fik det kurdiske parti *Demokratisk Union (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD)* og dets væbnede grene YPG/YPJ¹ kontrol over de kurdiskbefolkede områder langs den tyrkiske grænse: Afrin, Kobane og Jazeera.² I juni 2012 trak det syriske regime hovedparten af sine styrke tilbage fra området og bibeholdt blot en mindre tilstedeværelse i Jazeera.³

1.1. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)

Med støtte fra USA blev *Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)* formet i oktober 2015 som en koalition mellem den kurdiske PYD-milits YPG/YPJ¹ og en række lokale arabiske og assyriske militser. Det skete som led i kampen mod *Islamisk Stat (IS)*, efterhånden som YPG rykkede dybere ind i arabiske majoritetsområder.⁴ YPG forblev den stærkeste milits og udgør ryggraden af SDF.⁵ Fra 2015 til 2018 udvidede SDF sin kontrolzone langt ud over de kurdiske majoritetsområder og indtog næsten hele det territorium, som IS tidligere kontrollerede øst for Eufrat; inklusiv Syriens mest betydningsfulde olieletter samt byerne Manbij og Tabqa på flodens vest-side.⁶ Således kontrollerede SDF nu mere end en fjerdedel af det syriske territorium.⁷



Kilde: Washington Institute for Near East Studies, *Sectarism in Syria's Civil War*, January 2018, s. 53 [link](#)

¹ Folkets Beskyttelsesenheder (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) og Kvindernes Beskyttelsesenheder (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin, YPJ).

² ICG, *Flight of Icarus? The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria*, 8 May 2014, s. 2 [link](#)

³ ISW, *ISIS Works to Merge its Northern Front across Iraq and Syria*, 9 August 2014 [link](#)

⁴ Reuters, *New Syrian rebel alliance formed, says weapons on the way*, 12 October 2015 [link](#)


⁵ OFSS, *Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria*, 24 January 2018, s. 45 [link](#) KFCRIS, *Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): From Washington – Moscow agreement to Animosity with Turkey*, August – September 2016, s. 9 [link](#)

⁶ ICG, *Prospects for a Deal to Stabilise Syria's North East*, 5 September 2018, s. 1 [link](#)

⁷ ICG, *Prospects for a Deal to Stabilise Syria's North East*, 5 September 2018, s. 8 [link](#)

1.2. Tyrkisk intervention

YPG har dybe organisatoriske, personlige og ideologiske forbindelser til *Kurdistan Arbejderparti* (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*, PKK), som fortsætter en årtier lang oprørskamp mod den tyrkiske stat. Derfor har SDFs fremrykning siden 2015 ansporet tyrkisk militær intervention af to omgange. I 2016 angreb Tyrkiet sammen med tyrkiskstøttede oprørsgrupper IS og blokerede samtidig kurdiskledede styrkers linje mellem de nordøstlige besiddelser og den nordvestlige enklave, Afrin.⁸ Den 20. januar 2018 indledte Tyrkiet med tyrkiskstøttede oprørsgrupper *Operation Olive Branch* og angreb dermed Afrin.⁹ Den 18. marts 2018 indtog de Afrin by og fortrængte de kurdiskledede styrker samt tusindvis af civile kurdere fra området.¹⁰



Kilde: Institute for the Study of War, *Turkey's Next Phase in Afrin, Syria*, 23 January 2018 [link](#)

I modsætning til Kobane og Jazeera, som kom under amerikansk indflydelse i forlængelse af den internationale koalitions kamp mod IS, var Afrin indtil januar 2018 under russisk lufttrum og beskyttelse.¹¹ Det var derfor med Ruslands accept, at Tyrkiet indtog Afrin.¹² Som tyrkerne vandt terræn under *Operation Olive Branch* i Afrin, lagde de pres på USA ved at true med at udvide deres operationer til Manbij; en omstridt SDF-kontrolleret by vest for Eufrat, som USA hjalp med at erobre fra IS i 2016 og i 2018 fortsat havde en militær tilstedeværelse i. Efter pres fra Tyrkiet og som resultat af amerikansk mægling trak YPG sine krigere og rådgivere ud i 2018.¹³

⁸ ICG, *Prospects for a Deal to Stabilise Syria's North East*, 5 September 2018, s. 1 - 3 [link](#) ⁹ The Economist, *Can Syria's Kurds keep control of their territory?*, 25 January 2018, [link](#) ¹⁰ ISW, *Turkey Threatens New Attacks in Syria and Iraq*, 20 March 2018 [link](#)

¹¹ Paul Iddon, *The geopolitical significance of the Russian deployment to Afrin*, Rudaw, 29 March 2017 [link](#)

¹² Leonid Issaev, *Why is Russia helping Turkey in Afrin?*, Al-Monitor, 29 January 2018 [link](#) ¹³ ICG, *Prospects for a Deal to Stabilise Syria's North East*, 5 September 2018, s. 3 [link](#) Reuters, *All Kurdish YPG have left Syria's Manbij: local militia*, 15 June 2018 [link](#)

2. Afrin efter Operation Olive Branch

Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) vurderer, at 384 civile er omkommet siden begyndelsen af den tyrkiske offensiv.¹⁴

2.1. Civiles flugt fra kampene

I forbindelse med kampene i Afrin flygtede 137,070 til Tel Refaat, Nabal, Zahra, Fafin samt andre små landsbyer mellem Afrin og Aleppo kontrolleret delvist af SDF, delvist af den Syriske Regeringshær. Et fåtal flygtede tværs over landet til de andre SDF-kontrollerede områder som Manbij, Tal Tamer og Al-Malikiyah i Nordøstsyrien. Omkring 150.000 forblev i Afrin-området.¹⁵ For at flygte krævede det imidlertid en tilladelse fra PYD, da vejene ud af Afrin blev blokeret af YPG og det civile kurdiske politi, Asayish. Den fri bevægelighed og muligheden for flugt blev yderligere hindret, da den Syriske Regeringshær blokerede folk eller afkrævede betaling for tilladelse til bevægelse ind i de regeringskontrollerede områder som Aleppo, Nabal og Zahra. Endvidere har der været rapporter om, at YPG efter kamphandlingerne hindrede civile i at vende tilbage til Afrin.¹⁶

2.2. Generel sikkerhed efter operationen

På trods af afslutningen af de militære operationer i Afrin, er sikkerhedssituationen i Afrin fortsat ustabil. I kampen om at kontrollere forskellige territorier, har der været indbyrdes kampe mellem de forskellige tyrkiskstøttede oprørsgrupper.¹⁷

Da YPG tabte Afrin, udtalte de, at de ville ændre deres militære strategi fra konventionel krigsførelse til guerilla-taktikker.¹⁸ Mindre YPG-grupper og nyopståede kurdiske grupperinger har udført flere guerilla-angreb mod tyrkiske tropper såvel som tyrkiskstøttede oprørsgrupper. Samtidig rapporteres der om snigmord på informanter, kollaboratører og højtstående medlemmer af de tyrkiskstøttede oprørsgrupper.¹⁹ Desuden er der meldinger om bilbomber og andre IED'er, hvor både kombattanter og civile er omkommet.²⁰

¹⁴ SOHR, *Afrin under violation in 55 weeks, the international silence continues amid robberies, assault on houses, and looting in new ways*, 8 February 2019 [link](#)

¹⁵ UNOCHA, *Syrian Arab Republic: Afrin Crisis, Situation Report No. 3 (as of 24 April 2018)*, 24 April 2018 [link](#)

¹⁶ OHCHR, *Press briefing notes on the situation in Afrin, Syria*, 16 March 2018 [link](#)

UNHRC, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/39/65]*, 9 August 2018, nr. 68 [link](#)

HRW, *Human Rights Watch: Syria: Afrin Residents Blocked from Fleeing, Aid*, 8 April 2018 [link](#)

AI, *Syria: Turkey must stop serious violations by allied groups and its own forces in Afrin*, 2 August 2018 [link](#)

¹⁷ UNHRC, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/40/70]*, 31 January 2019, nr. 35 [link](#)

SOHR, *Turkey-backed Rebels Battle in Afrin*, 20 November 2018, [link](#)

UNOCHA, *Syria: Monthly Human Rights Digest – June 2018. Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, 4 July 2018, s. 5 [link](#)

¹⁸ Reuters, *Kurdish signal move to new phase of guerilla war on Turkish forces in Afrin*, 18 March 2018 [link](#)

¹⁹ SOHR, *Afrin area witnesses assassinations of leaders in factions loyal to Turkey and clashes against "cells" of the Kurdish forces leave casualties in the area*, 25 February 2019 [link](#)

Bellingcat, *Wrath of the Olives: Tracking the Afrin Insurgency Through Social Media*, 1 March 2019 [link](#)

²⁰ AJ, *Blast kills four in Syria's Afrin held by Turkish-backed rebels*, 16 December 2018 [link](#)

SOHR, *Explosion in Afrin city for the second day in a row causes more casualties*, 19 January 2019

[link](#) SOHR, *Powerful explosion hits rebel-controlled Afrin in northern Syria*, 28 February 2019 [link](#)

2.3. Ny administrationsstruktur

Tidligere var Afrin-distriktet under kurdisk kontrol og administration. Efter erobringen af Afrin gennemgik administrationen signifikante ændringer med nye autoriteter under tyrkisk opsyn. To tyrkiske statsborgere blev udpeget til at fungere som guvernører i Afrin. De rapporterer løbende til guvernøren i den tyrkiske naboprovins, Hatay. En syrisk statsborger er blevet udpeget som dommer.²¹ I slutningen af maj 2018 blev et politikorps bestående af forhenværende medlemmer af væbnede grupper udpeget.²² Det tyrkiske postvæsen åbnede i november 2018 en afdeling i Afrin by med det formål at udbyde post- og bankydelse samt andre logistiske/service ydelser for de lokale borgere og tyrkiske myndigheder.²³

2.4. Fri bevægelighed

Afrin-distriktet er blevet inddelt i sikkerhedszoner, der styres af de forskellige oprørsgrupper. Via kontrolposter administreres adgangen til de respektive områder. Det tyrkiske militær kontrollerer udkanten af Afrin-distriktet, og for at rejse imellem de forskellige sikkerhedszoner, landsbyer og byer skal civile have en skriftlig tilladelse af det tyrkiske militær eller de respektive oprørsgrupper.²⁴ I løbet af de seneste måneder skulle de tyrkiske kontrolposter være blevet afløst af lokale oprørsgrupper.²⁵

I landområderne er forekomsten af forsagere fra tidligere kamphandlinger begrænsende for de civiles fri bevægelighed. Der har været tilfælde af civile, som er blevet dræbt pga. forekomsten af forsagere.²⁶

2.5. Plyndringer og ødelæggelser

Dagen efter overtagelsen af Afrin by, kom de første meldinger om plyndringer og ødelæggelser.²⁷ Siden da har FN-organer, *Human Rights Watch* (HRW) og *Amnesty International* (AI) rapporteret om fortsatte plyndringer eller ødelæggelser af de civiles ejendomme og formuer, eksempelvis landbrugsudstyr og biler. UNOCHA har løbende modtaget meldinger om, at det især er gået udover kurdere. Dem, der flygtede fra deres hjem under offensiven i februar og marts 2018, har fået konfiskeret deres hjem. Flere tusinde soldater fra diverse oprørsgrupper er sammen med deres familier kommet til Afrin fra Idlib-området og Østghouta. Det gælder også for etniske arabere, som er internt fordrevne. Disse er blevet placeret i de forladte hjem. Andre har oplevet, at deres hjem er blevet plyndret og ødelagt.²⁸ Derudover er der rapporter om, at disse overgreb har været målrettet folk, der i mere eller mindre omfang har været associeret med de kurdiske styrker. UNOCHA har i et tilfælde bekræftet dette.²⁹ En lokal borger har

Bellingcat, *Wrath of the Olives: Tracking the Afrin Insurgency Through Social Media*, 1 March 2019 [link](#)

²¹ UNOCHA, *Syria: Monthly Human Rights Digest – June 2018. Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, 4 July 2018, s. 4-5 [link](#) ²² UNHRC, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/39/65]*, 9 August 2018, nr. 68 [link](#)

²³ AA, *Turkey to open post office in liberated Afrin, Syria*, 13 November 2018, [link](#)

²⁴ UNOCHA, *Syria: Monthly Human Rights Digest – June 2018. Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, 4 July 2018, s. 7 [link](#) ²⁵ UNHRC, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/40/70]*, 31 January 2019, nr. 68 [link](#)

²⁶ UNOCHA, *Syria: Monthly Human Rights Digest – June 2018. Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, 4 July 2018, s. 7 [link](#) UNHRC, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/40/70*, 31 January 2019, nr. 35 [link](#)

²⁷ BBC, *Syria war: Afrin looted by Turkish-backed rebels*, 19 marts 2018 [link](#)

²⁸ UNOCHA, *Syria: Monthly Human Rights Digest – June 2018. Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, 4 July 2018, s. 6-7 [link](#) HRW, *Syria: Turkey-backed groups seizing property*, 14 June 2018 [link](#)

AI, *Syria: Turkey must stop serious violations by allied groups and its own forces in Afrin*, 2 August 2018 [link](#)

²⁹ UNOCHA, *Syria: Monthly Human Rights Digest – June 2018. Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, 4 July 2018, s. 7 [link](#)

desuden gennem HRW berettet, at deres hjem blev konfiskeret, fordi et familiemedlem havde kæmpet for PKK.³⁰ UNOCHA frygter, at dette kan være et forsøg på en permanent forandring af den etniske sammensætning i området.³¹

Under høstsæsonen i 2018 har de lokale bønder oplevet, at medlemmer af tyrkiskstøttede oprørsgrupper konfiskerede deres olivenproduktion, som er deres levebrød. Mod beskyttelse af produktionen blev bønderne afkrævet enskat.³²

Endeligt har der været meldinger om angreb på og plyndringer af religiøse helligdomme for Yazidier, der ifølge UNHRC synes at have haft sekteriske undertoner.³³

2.6. Arbitrære arrestationer, tortur, kidnapninger og forsvindinger

Tyrkiskstøttede oprørsgrupper har udført arbitrære arrestationer, og UNHRC rapporterer om brug af tortur samt andre overgreb, især rettet mod folk af kurdisk oprindelse. Heriblandt er aktivister, der åbenlyst kritiserer oprørsgrupperne, og folk der af oprørsgrupperne menes at være kritiske. Ligeledes er folk, der er anklaget for at støtte PYD eller YPG, blevet arresteret og forhørt af medlemmer af oprørsgrupper såvel som tyrkiske officerer.³⁴ Der er også meldinger om arrestationer af medlemmer af den tidligere lokaladministration og deres familier, journalister og folk, der menes at støtte den syriske centralregering.³⁵

I forhold til kidnapninger og forsvindinger har UNOCHA dokumenteret mindst elleve sager, hvor civile, inklusiv kvinder og børn, er blevet kidnappet og løsladt mod betaling af løsepenge. I andre sager er det stadig uvist, hvor folk er henne.³⁶ På baggrund af interviews med de lokale beretter AI om samme forhold.³⁷

³⁰ HRW, *Syria: Turkey-backed groups seizing property*, 14 June 2018 [link](#)

³¹ UNOCHA, *Syria: Monthly Human Rights Digest – June 2018. Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, 4 July 2018, s. 7 [link](#) ³² UNHRC, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/40/70]*, 31 January 2019, nr. 67 [link](#)

SOHR, *In the Olive Season... the factions of 'Olive Branch' continue to thieve the crops and impose royalties over Afrin's farmers*, 20 Oktober 2018 [link](#)

Tastekin, Fehim, *Turkey's 'Olive Branch' takes root in Syrian olive business*, 16 December 2018 [link](#)

Armstrong, Will & Tse Yin Lee, *Turkey in a pickle over Syrian olives*, BBC, 31 January 2019 [link](#)

Pfahler, Lennart, *Erdogans Blutöl: Die Türkei raubt Olivenöl in Afrin und verkauft es nach Deutschland*, *Huffington Post*,

14 February 2019 [link](#)

³³ Jammie O'Connel, *Incident Report Feature: Intentional Destruction of Religious Sites in Afrin*, ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives, [link](#)

UNHRC, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/39/65]*, 9 August 2018, nr. 28 [link](#)

Bellingcat, *Olive branch Military Outpost Built Atop Afrin Cemetery*, 5 November 2018, [link](#)

³⁴ UNHRC, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/40/70]*, 31 January 2019, nr. 66 [link](#)

³⁵ UNHRC, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/39/65]*, 9 August 2018, nr. 26 [link](#)

³⁶ UNOCHA, *Syria: Monthly Human Rights Digest – June 2018. Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, 4. juli 2018, s. 6 [link](#) UN Security Council *Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258*

(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017) and 2401 (2018) [S/2018/947], 23 October 2018, s. 12 [link](#)

³⁷ AI, *Syria: Turkey must stop serious violations by allied groups and its own forces in Afrin*, 2 August 2018 [link](#)

Ofre og deres familier har berettiget, at de har meldt det til de lokale myndigheder uden nogen eller kun med ringe effekt.³⁸ SOHR har senest i februar 2019 meldt om kidnapninger for løsepenge.³⁹

3. Obligatorisk Selvforsvarstjeneste og YPG/SDF-rekruttering

I juli 2014 vedtog administrationen i de kurdisk-kontrollerede områder Loven for Obligatorisk Selvforsvarstjeneste, som pålægger mænd mellem 18 og 30 år at tjene i Selvforsvarsstyrkerne under YPG (Hezen Xweparastine, HXP).⁴⁰ Kvinder kan melde sig frivilligt.⁴¹

Loven blev først implementeret i Jazeera i november 2014⁴² og senere i Afrin i maj 2015.⁴³ I Kobani blev loven indført i juni 2016⁴⁴; efter dannelsen af SDF. Dog skriver Abdullah Al-Jabasini, at YPG allerede i 2012 begyndte at indkalde folk. På baggrund af sine kilder pointerer han dog samtidig, at rekrutteringspraksissen dengang var mild, og at der var mulighed for at afslå eller betale bestikkelse for at undgå tjeneste, men at unge efter indførelse af loven bliver taget med tvang.⁴⁵

Loven om obligatorisk selvforsvarstjeneste afkræver hver familie at stille et medlem ad gangen til at udføre tjenesten.⁴⁶ Der er tre undtagelser: 1) familiemedlemmer til personer, der er blevet martyret, 2) enebørn, og 3) personer der af medicinske årsager ikke kan udføre deres tjeneste.⁴⁷ Frivillig tjeneste i YPGs kamptropper, ophæver ligeledes denne pligt.⁴⁸

En kilde fra 2015 anfører, at kvinder i praksis også kan tvangsrekrutteres.⁴⁹

3.1. Den obligatoriske selvforsvarstjenestes varighed

Varigheden af tjenesten er blevet ændret over tid.⁵⁰ En version af lovteksten fra 2017 gældende for Jazeera siger, at tjenesten nu varer 12 måneder.⁵¹ Dette bakkes op af en *Mercy Corps*-rapport udgivet i marts

³⁸ UNHRC, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/40/70]*, 31 January 2019, nr. 65 [link](#)

³⁹ SOHR, *Hours after the disappearance of a family of 9 people mostly women and children, their kidnappers in Afrin countryside demand \$25000 to release them*, 26 November 2018 [link](#)

SOHR, *Between looting, theft, kidnapping, and trafficking in detainees, Afrin witnesses increased and expanded violations by 'Olive Branch' forces of the Turkish Forces*, 22 February 2019 [link](#)

⁴⁰ DIS, *Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG in Syria*, 26 February 2015, s. 16 [link](#)

⁴¹ Art. 3, *Lov om Obligatorisk Selvforsvarstjeneste [gældende for Jazeera]*, nr. 11 af 2017 [link](#)

⁴² DIS, *Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG in Syria*, 26 February 2015, s. 16 [link](#) ⁴³ DIS, *Syria. Update on Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and recruitment to the YPG*, September 2015, s. 21 [link](#)

⁴⁴ OFSS, *Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria*, 24 January 2018, s. 33 [link](#) Hassan, H. A., *Legislative Council of Kobani Passes Conscription Act*, *Basnews*, 5 June 2016 [link](#)

⁴⁵ Al-Jabassini, Abdullah, "Civil Resistance to Military Conscription in Kurdish Areas of Northern Syria: The Untold Story", *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 12/3, 2017, s. 104-110, s. 106

⁴⁶ DIS, *Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG in Syria*, 26 February 2015, s. 22 [link](#)

Art. 21 og 27, *Lov om Obligatorisk Selvforsvarstjeneste [gældende for Jazeera]*, nr. 11 af 2017 [link](#)

⁴⁷ DIS, *Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG in Syria*, 26 February 2015, s. 22 [link](#) OFSS, *Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria*, 24 January 2018, s. 25-26 [link](#)

⁴⁸ MC, *Tribal Cold War: Northeast Syria, the New Tribal System, and the Destabilization of the Kurdish Self Administration*, Marts 2019, s. 9 note 20

⁴⁹ DIS, *Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG in Syria*, 26 February 2015, s. 23 [link](#)

2019.⁵² *Northern Syria Observer* (NSO) skrev i december 2017, at tjenesten varer 9 måneder for personer, der melder sig frivilligt og 12 måneder for personer, der bliver indrullet efter arrestation.⁵³

3.2. Rekruttering uden for de kurdiske majoritetsområder (SDF)

Da SDF erobrede Manbij indførte de i samarbejde med de lokale råd Loven for Obligatorisk Selvforsvarstjeneste, hvilket dog førte til modstand blandt de lokale, hvorfor man trak loven tilbage og i stedet opfordrede folk til at melde sig frivilligt.⁵⁴ Det samme har gjort sig gældende i Raqqa. Ifølge Fabrice Balanche, har befolkningen i Raqqa dog affundet sig med loven.⁵⁵ Det er uklart, om SDF også har gjort det til et spørgsmål om frivillighed i Raqqa, og om det stadig er frivilligt i Manbij, og det er i det hele taget uklart, hvordan praksis for rekruttering er uden for de kurdiske majoritetsområder. NSO har rapporteret, at myndighederne havde givet familier frit lejde inden for en bestemt tidsramme til at sende deres sønner til tjenesten. Herefter havde militærpolitiet opsøgt og arresteret mænd i landsbyer øst for Raqqa for at sende dem til træningscentre.⁵⁶

Ifølge det Istanbul-baserede institut, *Oman For Strategic Studies*, blev rekrutterne fra den obligatoriske selvforsvarstjeneste placeret under SDF's kommando fra begyndelsen af 2016. I august 2017 var der tilføjet

6.000 af disse rekrutter til SDF. Studiet viser en liste over enheder, der er blevet trænet i arabiske majoritetsområder. Listen beskriver rekrutterne som værende både frivillige og tvangsrekrutterede.⁵⁷ *Syrian Observatory for Human Rights* (SOHR) beskriver ligeledes den obligatoriske selvforsvarstjeneste som værende under SDF's række.⁵⁸

3.3. Kamphandlinger

Rekrutterne i den obligatoriske selvforsvarstjeneste indgår i den styrke, der hedder HXP (*Hêzên Xweparastinê*).⁵⁹ Denne styrke bruges primært som hjælpetropper. De står bl.a. for at sikre områder ved at

EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Syria; 30 November & 1 December 2017; Valletta, Malta, March 2018, s. 63 [link](#)

⁵¹ Udlændingestyrelsens Landedokumentation er ikke bekendt med, om lovtæksten er implementeret i de andre SDF-kontrollerede områder.

Art. 2, *Lov om Obligatorisk Selvforsvarstjeneste [gældende for Jazeera]*, nr. 11 af 2017 [link](#)

⁵² MC, *Tribal Cold War: Northeast Syria, the New Tribal System, and the Destabilization of the Kurdish Self Administration*, Marts 2019, s. 9

⁵³ NSO, *The authorities of the Democratic Union Party impose forced recruitment on the people of the areas Raqqa province*, 15. December 2017 [link](#)

⁵⁴ Al-Monitor, *Manbij residents face off against SDF over conscription policy*, 24 November 2017 [link](#)

Institute for the Study of War, *Post-ISIS Insurgency Looms in Northern Syria*, 7 November 2017 [link](#)

SOHR, *Manbij city witnesses popular protests against imposing 'conscription' and alertness prevails the city with the escalation of the resentment and the tension of the citizen about the practice of the security forces there*, 5 November 2017 [link](#)

⁵⁵ Balanche, Fabrice, *The United States in Northern Syria: Geopolitical Strategy Cannot Ignore Local Reality*, Hoover Institution, 17 July 2018, s. 9 [link](#)

⁵⁶ NSO, *YPG arrest 18 young men in Raqqa countryside for forced conscription*, 2 November 2017 [link](#);

NSO, *The authorities of the Democratic Union Party impose forced recruitment on the people of the areas Raqqa province*, 15 December 2017 [link](#)

⁵⁷ OFSS, *Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria*, 24 January 2018, s. 45 [link](#)

Seliste over samtlige hold af rekrutter, der blev trænet i den givne af periode.

⁵⁸ SOHR, *Hundreds of young men are arrested within SDF-controlled areas as part of the recruiting for the 'self-defense duty' in conjunction with demobilization of 1000 fighters*, 26 September 2018 [link](#)

⁵⁹ OFSS, *Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria*, 24 January 2018, s. 25 [link](#)

bemandede kontrolposter,⁶⁰ at bemandede forsyningslinjerne til fronten, at yde logistisk service til YPG's enheder ved fronten og fremskudte positioner eller at bygge og renovere træningscentre og anden militær infrastruktur.⁶¹ En tidligere myndighedsperson har i 2016 udtalt, at de bliver trænet af YPG-soldater, men at HXP-enheder bruges som afløsere for YPG-styrker ved kontrolposter.⁶² SOHR rapporterer dog, at HXP-styrker har været mål for tyrkisk artilleri i Afrin,⁶³ og de var i direkte kamp under *Operation Olive Branch*.⁶⁴ Ligeledes rapporteres, at de i det østlige Syrien har været mål for angreb fra IS-celler.⁶⁵

3.4. Unddragelse og aftrædelse

I en version af lovtæksten fra 2017 gældende for Jazeera fremgår det, at personer uden lovlig udsættelse og tjenesteplichtige uden tjenestebog bliver sendt direkte til træningslejre.⁶⁶ Flere kilder melder om eksempler på eftersøgning og arrestation af tjeneste-unddragere.⁶⁷ Andre kilder beskriver pres om at melde sig til tjenesten fra kurdiske autoriteters side bl.a. i form af kampagner og erklæringer.⁶⁸ Abdullah Al-Jabassini melder, at borgere, der afslog at tjene, i nogle tilfælde blev frataget adgang til elektricitet, brændsel,

⁶⁰ MC, *Tribal Cold War: Northeast Syria, the New Tribal System, and the Destabilization of the Kurdish Self Administration*, Marts 2019, s. 9 note 20

⁶¹ OFSS, *Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria*, 24 January 2018, s. 27 [link](#)

⁶² Aranews, *Kurds launch conscription campaign to protect Kobane from ISIS attacks*, 21 June 2016 [link](#)

⁶³ SOHR, *Turkish forces shell Afrin countryside, killing and injuring about 16 most of them from the self-defense forces and Asayish*, 7 September 2016 [link](#)

⁶⁴ SOHR, *After continued and heavy shelling since Wednesday... the Turkish forces and the factions of Operation "Olive Branch" take control of about half of the city of Afrin*, 18 March 2018 [link](#)

⁶⁵ SOHR, *19 were killed yesterday including 2 members of the regime forces and militiamen loyal to them and 17 other people*, 11 March 2019 [link](#)

SOHR, *With air support from the Coalition, a Force of SDF raid a house of weapon dealers in a village near Busayrah in Deir Ezzor countryside*, 6. Marts 2019 [link](#)

SOHR, *Security chaos continues in Deir Ezzor countryside through more killing operations last of which targeted a member of the Self-Defense Forces east of the province*, 12 January 2019 [link](#)

SOHR, *About 15 members of the Self-Defense Forces were killed and injured in a new attack by cells of the organization near an oilfield east of the Euphrates*, 29 December 2018 [link](#)

SOHR, *A new revenge operation by the organization targets a commander in the Self-Defense Forces and the chief of a local council in the east of Deir Ezzor province*, 18 October 2018 [link](#)

SOHR, *ISIS continues to revenge for its loss in the east of the Euphrates through assassinating 2 members of the Self-Defense Forces in the southern countryside of Al-Hasakah*, 9 October 2018 [link](#)

SOHR, *A new assassination targets the Syria Democratic Forces and Self-Defense Forces killing 3 members of them in the east of the Euphrates River and the military operation of the International Coalition and the SDF in the area continues*, 14 September 2018 [link](#)

⁶⁶ Art. 6, *Lov om Obligatorisk Selvforsvarstjeneste [gældende for Jazeera]*, nr. 11 af 2017 [link](#)

⁶⁷ DIS– *Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG*, September 2015, s. 25 [link](#) Syria Direct, *Some Kurds dodge conscription, wary of rumored offensive for A-Raqqa: 'A battle that is not ours to fight'*, 24 May 2016 [link](#)

NSO, *Military Discipline, part of the YPG, chases defectors from recruitment*, 6. Marts 2017 [link](#)

SOHR, *Hundreds of young men are arrested within SDF-controlled areas as part of the recruiting for the 'self-defense duty' in conjunction with the demobilization of 1000 fighters*, 26. September 2018 [link](#)

The New Arab, *Hundreds of Syrians rounded up for compulsory SDF military service*, 3 juni 2018 [link](#)

⁶⁸ Syrian Voice, *Kurdish Self-Administration enforces draft, turning Kobane into 'ghost town'*, 26. April 2017 [link](#)

The New Arab, *Hundreds of Syrians rounded up for compulsory SDF military service*, 3 juni 2018 [link](#)

uddannelse og mad. Samtidig blev aftjening en måde, hvorpå man kunne få bedre adgang til diverse ydelser.⁶⁹

Mediekilden *Syria Direct* rapporterede i 2017, at loven praktiseres forskelligt, alt efter i hvilket område den gælder. I de nordlige kurdiske majoritetsområder søger de lokale myndigheder nogle gange efter mænd, der forsøger at undgå tjenesten, mens man i Tabqa og Manbij efter pres fra fremtrædende lokale og stammeledere har haft en politik om kun at bruge frivillige.⁷⁰

I en version af lovteksten fra januar 2016 fremgår det, at personer på trods af at være i besiddelse af en godkendt udsættelse af tjenesten vil blive arresteret og sendt til træningscentre, hvis de bliver fanget i at krydse grænsen udenudrejsetilladelse.⁷¹

Ifølge *Omran For Strategic Studies* er der en enhed ved navn *Military Discipline Units*, en slags militærpoliti, som bl.a. opsøger personer, der ikke har meldt sig til den obligatoriske tjeneste, og informerer dem om deres pligter. De samarbejder med den lokale administration i forhold til at udføre retskendelser. Det er også dem, der udsteder dokumentation for den obligatoriske tjeneste.⁷² SOHR melder, at det er det civile kurdiske politi, Asayish, som opsøger personer.⁷³

I november 2016 gav de kurdiske myndighederne amnesti til folk, der havde unddraget sig den obligatoriske selvforsvarstjeneste, og som frivilligt meldte sig. Hidtil blev der tilføjet tre måneders ekstra tjeneste, såfremt man unddrog sig tjenesten. Denne tilføjelse fjernede man med amnestien for at få flere til at melde sig frivilligt.⁷⁴

Efter endt tjeneste kan man, ifølge Balanche, vælge at fortsætte eller vende hjem.⁷⁵ Hvis man melder sig under YPG's rækker får man en månedlig løn.⁷⁶

I august 2018 rapporterede SOHR, at flere personer fra HXP annullerede deres kontrakter af frygt for hævnangreb og snigmord fra IS-associerede celler. SOHR melder ikke om konsekvenser for disse unddragende.⁷⁷

3.5. Rekruttering til YPG og SDF

Det er uklart, om der er et skel mellem YPG og SDF på den ene side og HXP på den anden side. Nogle kilder fra 2015 melder/oplyser, at der ikke er noget skel mellem rekruttering til YPG og HXP, og at den

⁶⁹ Abdullah Al-Jabassini, "Civil Resistance to Military Conscription in Kurdish Areas of Northern Syria: The Untold Story", *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 12/3, 2017, s. 104-110, s. 107

⁷⁰ Syria Direct, *Tribal leaders halt conscription policy by Kurdish-led forces in Manbij, Tabqa*, 8 November 2017 [link](#)

⁷¹ Abdullah Al-Jabassini, "Civil Resistance to Military Conscription in Kurdish Areas of Northern Syria: The Untold Story", *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 12/3, 2017, s. 104-110, s. 105-106

⁷² OFSS, *Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria*, 24 January 2018, s. 29 [link](#)

⁷³ SOHR, *Asayish arrests civilians and takes them for the 'Self-Defense duty'*, 5. December 2017 [link](#) ; DIS, SYRIA – *Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG*, September 2015, s. 24 [link](#) ⁷⁴ SD, *YPG draft evaders on the run after amnesty: 'Why would I fight to defend Arab lands?'*, 7 November 2016 [link](#) ⁷⁵ EASO – European Asylum Support Office: EASO COI Meeting Report: Syria; 30 November & 1

December 2017; Valletta, Malta, March 2018, s. 65 [link](#)

⁷⁶ Abdullah Al-Jabassini, "Civil Resistance to Military Conscription in Kurdish Areas of Northern Syria: The Untold Story", *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 12/3, 2017, s. 104-110, s. 107

⁷⁷ SOHR, *Threats of retaliation by ISIS push tens of volunteers in the self-defense forces east of Euphrates to stay in their homes and cancel their contracts out of fear of assassinations*, 31 August 2018 [link](#)

obligatoriske selvforsvarstjeneste fungerer som rekrutteringsbase til YPG.⁷⁸ *Mercy Corps* behandler dem som separate enheder.⁷⁹ OFSS behandler HXP som en separat enhed med en separat kommandostruktur, dog med overlap ind i SDF.⁸⁰

Ifølge kilder fra 2017 og 2018 foregår tvungen rekruttering til såvel YPG/YPJ som SDF.⁸¹ Andre kilder fra 2015 oplyser, at rekruttering til YPG overvejende foregår på frivillig basis, omend tvangsrekrutterede findes i deres rækker.⁸²

Balanche pointerer, at mange vælger at tilslutte sig YPG frivilligt af økonomiske årsager, da lønnen er god, og fordi man således er på det vindende hold.⁸³ Dog tilslutter nogle sig også, fordi YPG-militsen i modsætning til de arabiske militser i SDF ikke er under klan-ledelse. Dermed er det en måde, hvorpå unge arabiske mænd kan undgå de sociale hierarkier i de arabiske klaner og gennem YPG blive løftet socialt.⁸⁴ *Mercy Corps* melder om det samme og pointerer yderligere, at det i de kurdiske områder kan være sværere at komme i arbejde uden bevis for, at man har tjent sin selvforsvarspligt. Derudover er det også en måde for mænd at undgå at tjene i militsen *National Defence Forces* (NDF), som er loyal over for centralregeringen i Damaskus.⁸⁵

Balanche pointerer, at kvinder ikke bliver tvangsrekrutteret, men slutter sig til YPJ på frivillig basis. I nogle tilfælde ses, at kvinder slutter sig til for at flygte fra social kontrol.⁸⁶

⁷⁸ DIS, *SYRIA – Update on Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG*, September 2015, s. 21 [link](#)

Til spørgsmålet vedrører rekruttering til YPG, svarer syriens ekspert Fabrice Balanche, at der er 9 måneders obligatorisk militærtjeneste i YPG.⁷⁸ Læsedok forståelse af denne udtalelse er, at Balanche enten ser HXP og den obligatoriske selvforsvarstjeneste som en integreret del af YPG eller, at der er tale om en fortællelse, se EASO – EASO: EASO COI Meeting Report: Syria; 30 November & 1 December 2017; Valletta, Malta, March 2018, s. 63 [link](#)

⁷⁹ MC, *Tribal Cold War: Northeast Syria, the New Tribal System, and the Destabilization of the Kurdish Self Administration*, Marts 2019, s. 9 note 20

OFSS, *Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria*, 24. Januar 2018, s. 27 [link](#)

⁸⁰ OFSS – Omran For Strategic Studies, *Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria*, 24 January 2018, s. 26, 34 [link](#)

⁸¹ MEM, *YPG imposes conscription, disbands popular strike in Syria territories*, 21 May 2018 [link](#)

NSO, *SDF launch new forced recruitment campaign to enlist 1200 young man from Manbij and Tal Abyad in frontlines*, 10 July 2017 [link](#)

OHCHR, *Syria: Monthly Human Rights Digest - June 2017*, 30 June 2017, s. 4 [link](#)

UNHCR, *International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update V*, 3 November 2017 [link](#)

⁸² DIS, *SYRIA – Update on Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG*, September 2015, s. 27 [link](#)

⁸³ EASO: EASO COI Meeting Report: Syria; 30 November & 1 December 2017; Valletta, Malta, March 2018, s. 63 [link](#)
Fabrice Balanche, *The United States in Northern Syria: Geopolitical Strategy Cannot Ignore Local Reality*, Hoover Institution, 17 July 2018, s. 8 [link](#)

⁸⁴ EASO: EASO COI Meeting Report: Syria; 30 November & 1 December 2017; Valletta, Malta, March 2018, s. 64 [link](#)

⁸⁵ MC, *Tribal Cold War: Northeast Syria, the New Tribal System, and the Destabilization of the Kurdish Self Administration*, Marts 2019, s. 9

⁸⁶ EASO: EASO COI Meeting Report: Syria; 30 November & 1 December 2017; Valletta, Malta, March 2018, s. 64 [link](#)

3.6. Rekruttering af mindreårige

Kurdiske myndigheder har flere gange officielt erklæret ikke at ville involvere børn i kamphandlinger.⁸⁷ Trods det har bl.a. HRW løbende kunnet dokumentere tilfælde af mindreårige, som er blevet indlemmet og har kæmpet for YPG og YPJ.⁸⁸ Oplysningerne fra HRW bakkes op af FN. Ifølge FN øgedes rekrutteringen af børn til YPG/YPJ fra 2016 til 2018,⁸⁹ og tvang indgik i flere tilfælde som et element i rekrutteringen. FN pegede desuden på en ny trend i 2017, ifølge hvilken arabiske børn blev rekrutteret af væbnede kurdiske grupper inden for rammerne af SDF.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ MEI, *Child soldiers and the YPG*, 4 february 2019 [link](#)

ISW, *Underage girls recruited to Kurdish forces*, 29 March 2018, [link](#)

HRW, *“Maybe We Live and Maybe We Die” – Recruitment and Use of Children by Armed Groups in Syria*, 22 June 2014 [link](#)

HRW, *Key Steps Taken to End Use of Child Soldiers in Syria*, 11 September

2018 [link](#) ⁸⁸ HRW, *Syria: Armed Group Recruiting Children in Camps*, 3

August 2018 [link](#) IWPR, *Underage girls recruited to Kurdish forces*, 29 March 2018, [link](#)

⁸⁹ UNSC, *Children and armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic*, 30 October 2018, s. 16

[link](#) UNGASC, *Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-general*, 16 May 2018, s. 26 [link](#) ⁹⁰ UNSC, *Children and armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic*, 30 October

2018, s. 16 [link](#)

Bibliografi

AA - Anadolu Agency, *Turkey to open post office in liberated Afrin, Syria*, 13 November 2018 <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-to-open-post-office-in-liberated-afrin-syria/1309840>

AI – Amnesty International, *Syria: Turkey must stop serious violations by allied groups and its own forces in Afrin*, 2 August 2018
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/syria-turkey-must-stop-serious-violations-by-allied-groups-and-its-own-forces-in-afrin/>

AJ - Al-Jazeera, *Blast kills four in Syria's Afrin held by Turkish-backed rebels*, 16 December 2018 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/blast-kills-syria-afrin-held-turkey-backed-rebels-181216140639088.html>

Al-Jabassini, Abdullah, "Civil Resistance to Military Conscription in Kurdish Areas of Northern Syria: The Untold Story", *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 12 March 2017

Armstrong, Will & Tse Yin Lee, *Turkey in a pickle over Syrian olives*, *BBC*, 31 January 2019 <https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-47069403>

Al-Monitor, *Manbij residents face off against SDF over conscription policy*, 24 November 2017 <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/11/syria-democratic-forces-forced-conscription-manbij.html>

Balanche, Fabrice, *The United States in Northern Syria: Geopolitical Strategy Cannot Ignore Local Reality*, *Hoover Institution*, 17 July 2018
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/383981576-the-united-states-in-northeastern-syria-geopolitical-strategy-cannot-ignore-local-reality_1.pdf

Aranews, *Kurds launch conscription campaign to protect Kobane from ISIS attacks*, 21 June 2016 <http://aranews.net/files/2016/06/kurds-launch-conscription-campaign-to-protect-kobane-from-isis-attacks/>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *Manbij city witnesses popular protests against imposing 'conscription' and alertness prevails the city with the escalation of the resentment and the tension of the citizen about the practice of the security forces there*, 5 November 2017
<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=77886>

BBC, *Syria war: Afrin looted by Turkish-backed rebels*, 19 March 2018 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43457214>

Bellingcat, *Wrath of the Olives: Tracking the Afrin Insurgency Through Social Media*, 1 March 2019 <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2019/03/01/wrath-of-the-olives-tracking-the-afrin-insurgency-through-social-media/>

Bellingcat, *Olive branch Military Outpost Built Atop Afrin Cemetery*, 5 November 2018
<https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/11/05/olive-branch-military-outpost-built-atop-afrin-cemetery/>

DIS – Danish Immigration Service, *Syria. Update on Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and recruitment to the YPG*, September 2015

<https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=5629d2584&skip=0&query=mandatory%20military%20service&coi=SYR>

DIS – Danish Immigration Service, *Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG in Syria*, February 2015

<https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=54fd6c884&skip=0&query=mandatory%20military%20service&oi=SYR>

EASO – European Asylum Support Office: EASO COI Meeting Report: Syria; 30 November & 1 December 2017; Valletta, Malta, March 2018

https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1427709/1226_1522073171_syria-coi-meeting-report-nov-dec-2017-published-march-2018.pdf

The Economist, *Can Syria's Kurds keep control of their territory?* 25 January 2018

<https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/01/25/can-syrias-kurds-keep-control-of-their-territory>

ICG - International Crisis Group, *Flight of Icarus? The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria*, 8 May 2014

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/flight-icarus-pyd-s-precarious-rise-syria>

ICG - International Crisis Group, *Prospects for a Deal to Stabilise Syria's North East*, 5 September 2018

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b9928777.html>

Iddon, Paul, *The geopolitical significance of the Russian deployment to Afrin*, Rudaw, 29 March 2017

<http://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/29032017>

Issaev, Leonid, *Why is Russia helping Turkey in Afrin?*, Al-Monitor, 29 January 2018

<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/russia-helping-turkey-afrin-180125122718953.html>

Hassan, H. A., *Legislative Council of Kobani Passes Conscription Act*, Basnews, 5

June 2016 <http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/news/middle-east/279894>

HRW - Human Rights Watch, *Key Steps Taken to End Use of Child Soldiers in Syria*, 11

September 2018 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/11/key-steps-taken-end-use-child-soldiers-syria>

HRW - Human Rights Watch, *Syria: Armed Group Recruiting Children in Camps*, 3 August

2018 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/03/syria-armed-group-recruiting-children-camps>

HRW – Human Rights Watch, *Syria: Turkey-backed groups seizing property*, 14 June

2018 <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b87de0b4.html>

HRW – Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch: Syria: Afrin Residents Blocked from Fleeing, Aid*, 8 April 2018

<https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1428687.html>

HRW - Human Rights Watch, *“Maybe We Live and Maybe We Die” – Recruitment and Use of Children by Armed Groups in Syria*, 22 June 2014

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/06/22/maybe-we-live-and-maybe-we-die/recruitment-and-use-children-armed-groups-syria>

ISW - Institute for the Study of War, *Turkey Threatens New Attacks in Syria and Iraq*, 20 March 2018 <http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2018/03/turkey-threatens-new-attacks-in-syria.html>

ISW - Institute for the Study of War, *Post-ISIS Insurgency Looms in Northern Syria*, 7 November 2017 <http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2017/11/post-isis-insurgency-looms-in-northern.html>

ISW - Institute for the Study of War, *ISIS Works to Merge its Northern Front across Iraq and Syria*, 9 August 2014

<http://www.understandingwar.org/article/isis-works-merge-its-northern-front-across-iraq-and-syria>

IWPR - Institute for War and Peace Reporting, *Underage girls recruited to Kurdish forces*, 29 March 2018

<http://www.refworld.org/docid/5b8660b34.html>

KFCRIS – King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, *Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): From Washington – Moscow agreement to Animosity with Turkey*, August - September 2016

<https://www.kfcris.com/pdf/2b2225c00020fa12fcdb990701b690f9581a512c9a455.pdf>

Lov om Obligatorisk Selvforsvarstjeneste [gældende for Jazeera], nr. 11 af 2017

<http://www.encumenazagonsaz.com/2018/08/14/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%84/>

MEM - Middle East Monitor, *YPG imposes conscription, disbands popular strike in Syria territories*, 21 May 2018

<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180521-ypg-imposes-conscription-disbands-popular-strike-in-syria-territories/>

MC - Mercy Corps, *Tribal Cold War: Northeast Syria, the New Tribal System, and the Destabilization of the Kurdish Self Administration*, Marts 2019

Middle East Institute, *Child soldiers and the YPG*, 4 February

2019 <https://www.mei.edu/publications/child-soldiers-and-ypg>

The New Arab, *Hundreds of Syrians rounded up for compulsory SDF military service*, 3 June

2018 <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/6/3/hundreds-of-syrians-rounded-up-for-sdf-military-service>

NSO – Northern Syria Observer, *The authorities of the Democratic Union Party impose forced recruitment on the people of the areas Raqqa province*, 15 December 2017

<https://www.nso-sy.com/Details/782/The-authorities-of-the-Democratic-Union-Party-impose-forced-recruitment-on-the-people-of-the-areas-Raqqa-province/en>

NSO – Northern Syria Observer, *YPG arrest 18 young men in Raqqa countryside for forced conscription*, 2 November 2017

<https://www.nso-sy.com/Details/757/YPG-arrest-18-young-men-in-Raqqa-countryside-for-forced-conscription/en>

NSO – Northern Syria Observer, *SDF launch new forced recruitment campaign to enlist 1200 young man from Manbij and Tal Abyad in frontlines*, 10 July 2017

<https://www.nso-sy.com/Details/569/SDF-launch-new-forced-recruitment-campaign-to-enlist-1200-young-man-from-Manbij-and-Tal-Abyad-in-frontlines-/en>

NSO – Northern Syria Observer, *Military Discipline, part of the YPG, chases defectors from recruitment*, 6 March 2017

<https://www.nso-sy.com/Details/119/Military-Discipline,-part-of-the-YPG,-chases-defectors-from-recruitment/en>

O'Connel, Jammie, *Incident Report Feature: Intentional Destruction of Religious Sites in Afrin*, ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives

<http://www.asor-syrianheritage.org/incident-report-feature-afrin-religious-sites/>

OFSS – Omran For Strategic Studies, *Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria*, 24 January 2018

http://omranstudies.org/publications/reports/download/68_d403f01ed28320cb2e67b13cffb381c7.html

OHCHR, *Press briefing notes on the situation in Afrin, Syria*, 16 March 2018

<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22839&%3BLangID=E>

OHCHR-UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Syria: Monthly Human Rights Digest - June 2017*, 30 June 2017

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/59b926174.html>

Pfahler, Lennart, *Erdogans Blutöl: Die Türkei raubt Olivenöl in Afrin und verkauft es nach Deutschland*, *Huffington Post*, 14 February 2019

https://www.huffingtonpost.de/entry/blut-ol_de_5c628e7fe4b04a5c2b3100ae

Reuters, *All Kurdish YPG have left Syria's Manbij: local militia*, 15 June 2018

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-manbij/all-kurdish-ypg-have-left-syrias-manbij-local-militia-idUSKBN1K5113>

Reuters, *Kurdish signal move to new phase of guerilla war on Turkish forces in Afrin*, 18 March 2018

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-afrin-statement/kurds-signal-move-to-new-phase-of-querrilla-war-on-turkish-forces-in-afrin-idUSKBN1GU0KD>

Reuters, *New Syrian rebel alliance formed, says weapons on the way*, 12 October 2015

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds/new-syrian-rebel-alliance-formed-says-weapons-on-the-way-idUSKCN0S60BD20151012>

SD - Syria Direct, *Tribal leaders halt conscription policy by Kurdish-led forces in Manbij, Tabqa*, 8 November 2017

<https://syriadirect.org/news/tribal-leaders-halt-conscription-policy-by-kurdish-led-forces-in-manbij-tabqa/>

SD - Syria Direct, *YPG draft evaders on the run after amnesty: 'Why would I fight to defend Arab lands?'* 7 November 2016

<https://syriadirect.org/news/ypg-draft-evaders-on-the-run-after-amnesty-%E2%80%98why-would-i-fight-to-defend-arab-lands%E2%80%99/>

SD - Syria Direct, *Some Kurds dodge conscription, wary of rumored offensive for A-Raqqa: 'A battle that is not ours to fight'*", 24 May 2016

<https://syriadirect.org/news/tribal-leaders-halt-conscription-policy-by-kurdish-led-forces-in-manbij-tabqa/>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *19 were killed yesterday including 2 members of the regime forces and militiamen loyal to them and 17 other people*, 11 March 2019

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=120107>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *With air support from the Coalition, a Force of SDF raid a house of weapon dealers in a village near Busayrah in Deir Ezzor countryside*, 6 March 2019

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=119326>

SOHR - Syrian Observatory for Human Rights , *Afrin area witnesses assassinations of leaders in factions*

loyal to Turkey and clashes against "cells" of the Kurdish forces leave casualties in the area, 25 February 2019

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=117893>

SOHR - Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *Powerful explosion hits rebel-controlled Afrin in northern Syria*, 28 February 2019

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=118287>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *Afrin under violation in 55 weeks, the international silence continues amid robberies, assault on houses, and looting in new ways*, 8 February 2019

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=115849>

SOHR - Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *Between looting, theft, kidnapping, and trafficking in detainees, Afrin witnesses increased and expanded violations by 'Olive Branch' forces of the Turkish Forces*, 22 February 2019

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=117302>

SOHR - Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *Explosion in Afrin city for the second day in a row causes more casualties*, 19 January 2019

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=113063>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *Security chaos continues in Deir Ezzor countryside through more killing operations last of which targeted a member of the Self-Defense Forces east of the province*, 12 January 2019

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=112263>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *About 15 members of the Self-Defense Forces were killed and injured in a new attack by cells of the organization near an oilfield east of the Euphrates*, 29 December 2018

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=110773>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *Hours after the disappearance of a family of 9 people mostly women and children, their kidnapers in Afrin countryside demand \$25000 to release them*, 26 November 2018

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=107477>

SOHR - Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *Turkey-backed Rebels Battle in Afrin*, 20 November 2018

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=107100>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *In the Olive Season... the factions of 'Olive Branch' continue to thieve the crops and impose royalties over Afrin's farmers*, 20 October 2018

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=105024>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *A new revenge operation by the organization targets a commander in the Self-Defense Forces and the chief of a local council in the east of Deir Ezzor province*, 18 October 2018

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=104912>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *ISIS continues to revenge for its loss in the east of the Euphrates through assassinating 2 members of the Self-Defense Forces in the southern countryside of Al-Hasakah*, 9 October 2018

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=104336>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *Hundreds of young men are arrested within SDF-controlled areas as part of the recruiting for the 'self-defense duty' in conjunction with demobilization of 1000 fighters*, 26 September 2018

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=103324>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *A new assassination targets the Syria Democratic Forces and Self-Defense Forces killing 3 members of them in the east of the Euphrates River and the military operation of the International Coalition and the SDF in the area continues*, 14 September 2018

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=102434>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *Threats of retaliation by ISIS push tens of volunteers in the self-defense forces east of Euphrates to stay in their homes and cancel their contracts out of fear of assassinations*, 31 August 2018

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=101425>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *After continued and heavy shelling since Wednesday... the Turkish forces and the factions of Operation "Olive Branch" take control of about half of the city of Afrin*, 18 March 2018

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=87003>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *Asayish arrests civilians and takes them for the 'Self-Defense duty'*, 5 December 2017

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=80046>

SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, *Turkish forces shell Afrin countryside, killing and injuring about 16 most of them from the self-defense forces and Asayish*, 7 September 2016

<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=50392>

SV - Syrian Voice, *Kurdish Self-Administration enforces draft, turning Kobane into 'ghost town'*, 26 April 2017

<http://syrianvoice.org/en/archives/2436>

Tastekin, Fehim, *Turkey's 'Olive Branch' takes root in Syrian olive business*, 16 December 2018

<https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/12/turkey-syria-making-money-from-afrin.html>

UNGAC - United Nations General Assembly Security Council, *Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-general*, 16 May 2018

<http://undocs.org/s/2018/465>

UNHRC - UN Human Rights Council: *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/40/70]*, 31 January 2019

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_40_70.pdf

UNHRC - UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights): *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/39/65]*, 9 August 2018

https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1443546/1930_1537263792_g1824615.pdf

UNHCR – UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update V*, 3 November 2017

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/59f365034.html>

UNOCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Syria: Monthly Human Rights Digest – June 2018. Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, 4 July 2018

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ohchr_-_syria_monthly_human_rights_digest_-_june_2018.pdf

UNOCHA, *UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Syrian Arab Republic: Afrin Crisis, Situation Report No. 3 (as of 24 April 2018)*, 24 April 2018

https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1454551/1788_1544795785_2404.pdf

UNSC - United Nations Security Council, *Children and armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic*, 30 October 2018

<http://undocs.org/s/2018/969>

UNSC - UN Security Council *Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191*

(2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017) and 2401 (2018) [S/2018/947], 23 October 2018

https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1450109/1226_1542035101_n1833353.pdf